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Abstract 
This study makes a case for a biopsychosocial model of OCD that draws 
together fragmented bodies of evidence and understandings from different 
academic fields.  Evidence for biological and psychological contributions to the 
aetiology and maintenance of the disorder are reviewed with particular attention 
to the cognitive appraisal model. The cognitive model does not fully explain the 
high inter-relationships between OCD-related belief domains or why collectively 
they have specificity for predicting OCD over and above other disorders, 
implying that another variable may underlie these domains. The traditional 
conceptualisation of cognition may benefit from being broadened to encompass 
biological and social aspects.  Ostracism research, neuroscientific evidence, 
evolutionary theory and psycho-linguistic theory (specifically dialogism theory, 
which conceptualises thinking as dialogue between internalised “voices”) may 
cast further light on a common domain contributing to different OCD-relevant 
beliefs.  The term “punitive ostracism experiences” (POE) is coined to describe 
a variable that may form this common domain.  POE consists of memories of 
non-contingent punitive ostracism in childhood; unforgiving self-to-self relating; 
and social information processing bias reflected in attributions of ostracism 
intent in ambiguous situations.   POE was operationalized using existing and 
adapted measures and a new intent attributions measure which was 
constructed for the purposes of this study.  The constituent variables of POE 
were hypothesised to contribute to the variance of obsessive beliefs factors and 
to explain some of the relationship between obsessive beliefs and obsessive 
compulsive symptoms in a non-clinical sample. Evidence that is supportive of 
this hypothesis is presented.  Conclusions are drawn and suggestions for future 
research are made.   Implications for clinical practise are also considered. 
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Do punitive ostracism experiences add to our understanding of obsessive 
compulsive beliefs and their relationship to obsessive compulsive 
symptoms? An exploratory study and pilot of a new measure. 
 
1. Introduction 
1. 1 The Challenge of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
It has been estimated that at any given time, 1.1% of the UK population suffers 
from obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) (Torres et al 2006), with estimates 
of lifetime prevalence varying from 1.6% (Kessler, Berglund, Demler, Jin, & 
Walters, 2005) to 2.5% (Karno, Golding, Sorenson, & Burnam, 1988) and a 
worldwide prevalence rate of 2% (Sasson, 1994).   It is one of the most 
common psychiatric disorders (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992).  Sufferers have 
been found to have higher rates of comorbidity and suicide than those who 
experience other forms of anxiety (Torres et al).      Distressing obsessions and 
compulsions preoccupy sufferers, interfering with their daily functioning, work 
and relationships (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Sufferers normally 
view their compulsions as excessive and unreasonable and their obsessional 
thoughts as intrusive and alien to their sense of self.  Obsessional thoughts and 
images generally share common themes.  Sufferers may, for example, imagine 
themselves behaving inappropriately or violently; they may have thoughts about 
causing or failing to prevent fires, burglaries, infection and contamination; or 
they may worry about losing or displacing things.  In attempting to reduce the 
discomfort caused by intrusive obsessions, sufferers typically engage in 
repeated, often time-consuming compulsive behavioural rituals or mental acts 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  These include cleaning, checking, 
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ordering, hoarding, counting (Rasmussen & Eisen) and confessing (Swedo, 
Rapoport, Leonard, Lenane & Cheslow 1989). In addition to being personally 
costly, the condition also has significant economic costs in terms of healthcare 
and lost productivity (Dupont, Rice, Shirake & Roland, 1995). The need to 
develop valid models and effective treatments for such a disabling and relatively 
prevalent condition (described as a “hidden epidemic” by Wolff,  Alsobrook & 
Pauls, 2000) is reflected in the large body of OCD research located within a 
variety of academic disciplines.   
Popular treatments for OCD include pharmacological treatment, behaviour 
therapy and more recently, cognitive therapy.  Whilst all these treatments have 
been found to be efficacious to some degree, significant numbers do not 
improve (e.g. 30% of patients did not respond to either pharmacological or 
behavioural treatment in Foa et al’s (2005) study; 33% failed to respond to 
cognitive treatment and 41% to behavioural treatment in research by Whittal, 
Thordarson & McLean, 2004).  At a 2 year follow-up, 50% of patients had 
relapsed (Whittal, Robichaud, Thordarson & McLean, 2008).  Cognitive models 
do not appear to have brought the same improvements in treatment efficacy in 
OCD (Steketee, Frost, & Wilson, 2002; Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 2005) as 
they have in other anxiety disorders such as panic disorder (Siev & Chambless, 
2007). 
This, therefore, is the challenge for OCD research: “OCD treatment has 
reached a plateau and may require a fresh perspective to move forward” 
(Whittal, Robichaud, Thordarson, & McLean, 2008. p.1003).   The present study 
proposes that new understandings of OCD and new effective treatments may 
potentially emerge from a biopsychosocial perspective.  Gilbert (2009, p. 403) 
encourages the use of such a perspective for theorising and research within 
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mental health suggesting that: “cognitive processes cannot stand equivalent to 
all psychological processes”  and that “…a research focus on motivation, 
human needs, developmental processes, social relationships and contexts is 
important in any comprehensive model of mental health”.  This thesis suggests 
that current models of OCD may be usefully extended by drawing together 
strands of knowledge from various fields including neuroscience, 
psycholinguistics, social, cognitive and evolutionary psychology to form a 
biopsychosocial model of OCD.  
Phenomenological accounts of OCD form the starting point for this 
biopsychosocial perspective.  Rachman (1997, p.794) highlights the moral 
theme common to many obsessions when he suggests that OCD sufferers fear 
that “if other people knew about my obsessions and/or their content they would 
completely reject me” implying that their anxieties relate to moral accountability.  
A common fear in OCD of being blamed and condemned in a harsh and 
absolute manner was highlighted using qualitative research methodology by 
Ehntholt, Salkovskis and Rimes (1999).  Such accounts of OCD sufferers’ fears 
of social rejection point to the potential value of linking OCD models with 
existing theories and research relating to the social psychology of ostracism and 
social affiliation.  It is argued here that extending current biological and 
psychological models by incorporating “the social” into a more holistic, 
biopsychosocial model of OCD, may potentially offer the “fresh perspective” that 
has been called for by Whittal et al (2008) and this proposition forms the basis 
of the current study.  Current models of OCD will first be considered. 
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1.2 Models of OCD 
Evidence-based models of OCD include neurobiological, behavioural and 
cognitive models.   
 
1.2.1. The Neurobiological Model 
Understandings regarding the biological basis of OCD have to date been based 
on three sources of evidence: genetic evidence; neurochemical abnormalities 
and neuro-anatomical abnormalities (Jenike, 2001).  Each of these will be 
considered in turn.   
1.2.1.1 Genetic model 
Some evidence for the genetic model of OCD vulnerability has been produced 
by twin studies, which have found a greater concordance of OCD in identical 
twins than in non-identical twins (Van Grooheest, Cath, Beekman & Boomsma, 
2005). Family studies have found that the prevalence and patterning of OCD in 
families of OCD sufferers are consistent with a genetic mode of inheritance 
(Grisham, Anderson & Sachdev, 2008).  However, a substantial proportion of 
OCD cases are “sporadic,” with no other first-degree relatives affected 
(Samuels, 2009), suggesting a complex relationship between environmental 
and genetic factors.  The search for genes is complicated by the clinical 
complexity of OCD, and it has been suggested that certain phenotypes such as 
the hoarding subtype of OCD (Saxena, 2008) and tic-related OCD (Samuels et 
al, 2007) may have more significant genetic contributions than other types.  In 
summary, certain subtypes of OCD may be more heritable than others, but the 
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genetic basis of OCD is not yet fully understood and specific genes causing 
OCD have not been conclusively identified (Samuels).    
1.2.1.2 Serotonin hypothesis 
The neuro-chemical imbalance model of OCD has focused mainly on the 
serotonin hypothesis, which claims that symptoms of OCD are the result of 
under-activated serotonin pathways (e.g. Winslow & Insel, 1990).  Evidence for 
the serotonin hypothesis of OCD mainly comes from pharmacological outcome 
studies (Abramowitz, 2005) which have provided some evidence that selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are more efficacious than other 
medications in the treatment of OCD.  However, results from research on 
serotonin dysfunction in OCD are equivocal (Shafran, 2005).  For instance, 
some OCD sufferers respond poorly to SSRI medication and some respond 
better to other forms of medication (such as atypical antipsychotics and certain 
benzodiazepines) suggesting that other neurotransmitters (such as dopamine) 
may also play a role (Jenike & Rauch, 1994).  Successful treatment using 
SSRIs can not be taken to indicate that OCD is caused by serotonin 
deficiencies nor does it tell us about the mechanisms involved in its aetiology 
and maintenance (Salkovskis, 2002).  
1.2.1.3 Neuro-anatomical contributions 
Specific brain structures and the communication pathways between them have 
also been investigated in relation to OCD.  Results from functional, metabolic 
and structural imaging studies indicate that the orbitofrontal-striatal cortex 
(OFC) and connected limbic structures such as the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) and amygdala contribute to the pathology of OCD (e.g. Graybiel & 
Rauch,  2000; Menzies et al, 2008).  The nature of the relationship between 
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these observations and obsessive compulsive (OC) symptoms is unknown 
(Menzies et al).  Nevertheless, reductions in OC symptoms following therapy 
have been shown to be associated with decreases in abnormal brain 
functioning (Saxena et al, 1999) highlighting the relevance of brain-based 
understandings of OCD.   
1.2.1.4 Critique of neurobiological models 
Abramowitz (2005) has criticised neurobiological models for being “contentless” 
in that they offer no explanation for OCD phenomena such as obsessions and 
compulsions.  Nor can purely biological models explain the consistency in the 
content of obsessions (Abramowitz); for example, intrusive thoughts of harm are 
invariably targeted at the defenceless rather than at the powerful (Rachman, 
1997).  Shafran (2005) notes that the design of existing neurobiological studies 
does not permit conclusions that the differences are related to the cause of 
OCD since studies are correlational rather than experimental.  Although 
neurobiological models have not provided a full account of OCD, the findings 
certainly highlight the biological aspect of OCD and the importance of 
incorporating this dimension into a comprehensive model of OCD. 
1.2.2 The Behavioural model 
Behavioural understandings of the acquisition and maintenance of OCD are 
based on Mowrer’s (1960) two-stage theory of avoidance learning.  This theory 
proposes that an anxiety-provoking unconditioned stimulus is first linked with a 
neutral, conditioned stimulus (i.e. intrusive thoughts) such that when an 
intrusive thought subsequently occurs, it is sufficient to trigger anxiety (i.e. 
classical conditioning).  Second, after the conditioned stimulus has triggered 
anxiety, the individual learns (via operant conditioning) to escape, neutralise or 
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avoid stimuli that evoke obsessional thoughts.  Negative reinforcement of such 
compulsions (i.e. anxiety reduction) maintains and increases these responses.  
Compulsions prevent the obsessions from being extinguished (Rachman & 
Hodgson, 1980).  
A series of experimental studies demonstrated that performance of compulsive 
behaviours decreased anxiety associated with obsessional stimuli (Rachman & 
Hodgson, 1980). The exposure and response prevention (ERP) approach to 
treatment is based on behavioural theory, the idea being that by preventing the 
performance of the compulsion, the obsession is allowed to habituate.  
Controlled outcome studies have shown that 60-70% of clients show 
improvement after ERP (Jenike, 2001).  However, there is a high non-
compliance rate with ERP (30%) as it is very demanding of clients (e.g. Stanley 
& Turner, 1995).   
1.2.1 Critique of behavioural model 
The behavioural model has been criticised on the basis that little evidence has 
been found to support the first stage of the model (Rachman & Wilson, 1980).  
In addition, behavioural theory does not explain some of the clinical phenomena 
that are peculiar to OCD, such as the observation that the presence of a 
therapist decreases obsessional anxiety and compulsive checking (Rachman, 
1976). These criticisms, together with the cognitive nature of obsessions, led to 
the consideration of cognitive components of OCD. 
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1.2.3 Cognitive models of OCD 
A variety of cognitive models of OCD exist, the majority being cognitive 
appraisal models but they also include a cognitive deficit model.  Cognitive 
models are considered below. 
1.2.3.1 The cognitive deficit model 
It has been suggested that OCD may result from cognitive deficits such as 
memory or reality monitoring impairments, but research findings provide only 
weak support for global memory deficits (Abramowitz, 2005).  Some studies 
have shown apparent deficits in memory recall in OCD (e.g. Tallis, 1997).  
However, Abramowitz suggests that it is most likely that anxiety and uncertainty 
cause OCD participants to delay or withhold recall.  The most consistent finding 
is that compared to controls, OCD sufferers have less confidence in their 
memory, which is not a memory deficit as such but rather an appraisal error that 
leads sufferers to conclude that their memories are untrustworthy (Muller & 
Roberts, 2005).  It has been suggested that compulsive checking results at 
least in part from such decreased memory confidence, particularly in situations 
where there is a perception of responsibility for mistakes (Radomsky & 
Rachman, 1999; Tolin et al, 2001).  As perceived responsibility for the outcome 
of checking increases, the memory bias in favour of threat-relevant information 
appears to be amplified (Radomsky, Rachman & Hammond, 2001).  Van den 
Hout and Kindt (2003a, 2003b) provide some experimental evidence that 
checking causes memory distrust.  The evidence therefore suggests that 
mistaken beliefs about one’s memory appear to be more relevant in 
understanding OCD than actual cognitive deficits.  Doubts about memory could 
be conceptualised as a type of intrusive thought, which, like other intrusions in 
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OCD, has moral overtones (people may be held morally accountable for wrong 
judgements and for forgetting).  It is only when we are absolutely certain that we 
have remembered correctly that we can we feel sure that we will not be held 
morally accountable and blamed.   
1.2.3.2 Overview of cognitive appraisal models of OCD 
The majority of cognitive models in OCD are cognitive appraisal models that are 
based on a model of emotional disorders developed by Beck (1976).  This 
model posits that distorted beliefs have a causal relationship with 
psychopathology.   For example, beliefs about loss and failure may lead to 
depression (Beck; Beck & Emery, 1985). According to this model, the content of 
people’s “automatic thoughts” (rapid appraisals of situations) reflect these 
underlying beliefs or “schemas”.  Schemas are sometimes referred to as 
“cognitive structures” (e.g. Meichenbaum, 1977) which develop as a result of 
childhood experiences.  They are viewed as  generalised organising 
frameworks or rules which are used to “classify, interpret, evaluate and assign 
meanings to events” (Weishaar & Beck, 1986).  Schemas therefore influence 
individuals’ perceptions of themselves, others, and the environmental 
information an individual attends Examples of them are often given in 
declarative form such as “I am not worthy” and “The world is unfair” (Wessler, 
1986, p.22).  The assimilation of new experiences into existing schemas may 
therefore be biased in favour of these underlying assumptions.  Such biases 
(which include over-generalizing, mind reading, catastrophizing, and jumping to 
conclusions) are termed “cognitive distortions” and these are viewed as the 
active processes that form a bridge between schemas and automatic thoughts.  
The model also proposes that these schemas are more activated at times of 
stress and low mood.   Cognitive therapy is based on the idea that by 
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encouraging individuals to identify their thoughts, evaluate them and replace 
them with more realistic, rational thoughts, they can change their problematic 
emotions, beliefs, and behaviours.  
A range of cognitive appraisal models of OCD have been developed, each 
emphasising a particular belief domain in its theorising and treatment focus, but 
each sharing in common the general principles of Beck’s cognitive appraisal 
models.    For instance, they all share the principle that obsessional problems 
occur “as a result of the appraisal of otherwise normal intrusive thoughts, 
images and impulses as highly significant or threatening.” (Shafran, 2005, 
p.231).   An international group of researchers (Obsessive Compulsive 
Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG), 1997) clarified the distinction between 
different “levels” of cognition in cognitive models of OCD, namely intrusions, 
appraisals and assumptions.  Intrusions are unwanted thoughts; appraisals 
refer to “misinterpretations” or “faulty” meanings that are assigned to specific 
intrusions (similar to Beck’s (1976) automatic thoughts); whilst assumptions are 
enduring beliefs (similar to Beck’s “schemas”) that are “pan-situational rather 
than specific to a particular event” (OCCWG, p. 670).   These “levels” of 
cognition and meaning-making interact and influence each other (OCCWG) in a 
linear fashion.   
 
The OCCWG (1997) identified six cognitive belief domains upon which the 
various cognitive appraisal models of OCD have been based.  These are: 
 
1 over-estimation of threat: the tendency to believe that certain benign 
situations, sensations and mental events are dangerous (e.g. Carr, 1974 
and Mcfall & Wollersheim, 1979); 
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2 inflated responsibility: the belief that one has pivotal responsibility for 
preventing harm (e.g. Salkovskis, 1985); 
3 perfectionism:  beliefs about the necessity (and possibility) of doing 
something perfectly (OCCWG, 2001, 2003, 2005); 
4 intolerance of uncertainty: beliefs that uncertainty is dangerous and 
cannot be tolerated (Rachman, 2000a, 2000b); 
5 importance of controlling ones thoughts: beliefs that thoughts can and 
must be controlled (e.g. Purdon & Clark, 1999); 
6 over-importance of thoughts: beliefs about the significance of thoughts 
(that is, believing that thoughts can be harmful) (e.g. Rachman, 1997, 
1998). 
Evidence that these six belief domains are relevant to OCD is considered 
below:  
1.2.3.3 Overestimation of threat. 
• Introduction 
The overestimation of threat hypothesis posits that obsessional problems occur 
when sufferers exaggerate the probability or severity of harm (Carr, 1974; 
OCCWG, 2001).   A more complex version of this belief domain posits that an 
inflated appraisal of danger combines with a secondary appraisal in which 
individuals underestimate their ability to cope with the perceived danger (McFall 
& Wollersheim, 1979, Guidano & Liotti, 1983).   
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• Critique of the hypothesis 
In support of the danger-expectancies hypothesis, Frost, Steketee, Cohn and 
Griess (1994) demonstrated that individuals high in OC symptoms were more 
risk averse than a control group.   Jones and Menzies (1997a) found that, 
consistent with this hypothesis, danger expectancy (in comparison with 
perfectionism, anticipated anxiety and self-efficacy) was the most likely 
mediator of washing behaviours in OCD sufferers.  A further experimental 
study, which involved manipulating the perceived level of danger in two groups 
of OCD sufferers, found some evidence that higher perceived danger was 
related to increased urges to wash (Jones & Menzies, 1998a). Subsequently, 
Jones and Menzies (1998b) found that a treatment package for OCD washers 
that targets danger-related cognitions produced significant results in terms of 
reducing symptoms (but this was not maintained at follow up).  Evidence that 
perceived danger is also a function of decreased prediction of ability to cope 
was produced by Steketee, Frost and Cohen (1998) who found that OCD 
patients’ estimations of their ability to cope with OCD-related negative 
occurrences was significantly less than anxious and non-anxious controls. 
Some evidence calls into question the specificity and utility of models based on 
this hypothesis.  For instance, there is evidence that overestimations of threat 
are not OCD specific but rather are also correlated with other anxiety disorders 
(OCCWG, 2003).  Whilst Woods, Frost and Steketee (2002) found evidence 
supporting the notion that OC symptoms negatively correlate with predicted 
coping ability in clinical and student samples, severity and probability 
predictions on the other hand had less consistent predictive value across the 
two groups.  Moritz and Jelinek (2009) and Moritz and Pohl (2009) found no 
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evidence that OCD sufferers overestimate the probability of negative or OCD-
related events but they did perceive themselves to be significantly more 
vulnerable than non-sufferers.   
1.2.3.4  Inflated responsibility 
• Introduction 
Inflated responsibility in this context refers to the belief that one has “pivotal 
responsibility” for preventing “subjectively crucial negative outcomes in the real 
world or at a moral level” (OCCWG, 2001, p. 1003) which may result from 
actions and failures to act (OCCWG, 1997).   Whilst intrusive thoughts are 
common to nearly everyone (e.g. Rachman & de Silva, 1978), Salkovskis 
(1985) suggests that OCD sufferers alone appraise such thoughts as indicating 
that they have pivotal responsibility for harmful outcomes.  Such outcomes are 
seen by OCD sufferers as essential to prevent (Frost & Steketee, 2002).  The 
perceived outcomes may be actual, that is, having consequences in the real 
world and/or at a moral level (Salkovskis & Forrester, 2002).  OCD sufferers are 
viewed as having the same motivations (to prevent harm) as others but are 
excessively concerned about them and “trying too hard” to ensure they are not 
responsible for harm (Shafran, 2005, p. 233).   Appraisals of inflated 
responsibility are argued to have various consequences such as discomfort, 
increased accessibility and salience of intrusions, increased attention to 
environmental triggers, and behavioural responses which aim to reduce the 
sense of responsibility (Shafran).  Such behavioural responses include 
avoidance, neutralisation, compulsions, reassurance seeking and thought 
suppression (Salkovskis; Salkovskis & McGuire, 2003).  
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• Critique of the hypothesis 
Consistent with this hypothesis, self-report measures of responsibility appraisals 
correlate with measures of OC symptoms (OCCWG, 2001; 2003; Salkovskis et 
al, 2000; Wilson & Chambless, 1999). Since correlation can not be taken to 
imply causation (Salkovskis & McGuire, 2003) experimental studies have 
attempted to address this issue by manipulating levels of perceived 
responsibility in groups of OCD sufferers and non- sufferers (Arntz, Voncken & 
Goosen, 2007; Ladouceur et al, 1995; Lopatka & Rachman, 1995).   Increased 
responsibility differentially impacted on OCD sufferers in that  they alone 
responded to increases and decreases in responsibility levels with 
corresponding significant increases and decreases in OC experiences and 
behaviours (such as checking behaviours). Findings supporting the 
responsibility hypothesis were also obtained when responsibility was 
manipulated by the presence/ absence of a trusted other person (Shafran, 
1997) resulting in decreases/increases (respectively) of OC behaviours in OCD 
sufferers.  A questionnaire study demonstrated that people with OCD are not 
just concerned about taking wrong action but are also more sensitive to “errors 
of omission” (errors caused by failures to act) compared to anxious and non-
anxious controls (Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000).  This supports the notion that OCD 
sufferers assume responsibility in an increased range of situations compared to 
non-sufferers. 
Responsibility appraisals have not been consistently identified as having 
discriminant validity in relation to OCD (e.g. Sica et al, 2004; Tolin, Worhunsky 
& Maltby, 2006). Menzies, Harris, Cumming and Einstein (2000) have argued 
that experiments that manipulate responsibility also inadvertently change 
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danger estimations, thus confounding conclusions about the causal role of 
responsibility in OCD.  Pleva and Wade (2006) posit that perfectionism partially 
mediates the relationship between responsibility attitudes and OCD.    
Metacognitive beliefs (beliefs about thinking) have also been shown to have a 
mediating effect on the link between responsibility appraisals and OC symptoms 
(Gwilliam, Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; Myers & Wells, 2005). Such 
inconsistency has highlighted the complexity of interactions that link different 
belief domains including responsibility beliefs (Lind & Boschen, 2009).   
1.2.3.5 Perfectionism  
• Introduction 
Perfectionism is defined as the tendency to believe “there is a perfect solution to 
every problem, that doing something perfectly (i.e. mistake free) is not only 
possible, but also necessary, and that even minor mistakes will have serious 
consequences” (OCCWG, 2001, p.1004). In fact, 40% of OCD sufferers report 
subjective discomfort/distress as the only consequence of not completing their 
compulsions (Tolin, Abramowitz, Kozak & Foa, 2001).  Subjective discomfort 
associated with perfectionism has been described as a feeling of “just not right” 
(Leckman, Walker, Goodman, Pauls, & Cohen, 1994).  OCD sufferers describe 
performing compulsions until a “just right” feeling is achieved (Leckman et al).  
Perfectionism is commonly measured as a multi-dimensional construct (Frost, 
Marten, Lahart & Rosenblate, 1990; Hewitt & Flett, 1991).  Some dimensions 
have been argued to belong to the non-pathological concept of 
“conscientiousness” (Flett & Hewitt, 2006) whilst others (e.g. Concern over 
Mistakes, Frost et al,) may be at the core of the maladaptive aspect of 
perfectionism (Shafran, Cooper & Fairburn, 2002).  For instance, Suzuki (2005) 
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found that of the perfectionism dimensions measured, only Concern over 
Mistakes was a significant predictor of OC symptoms and similarly Sassaroli et 
al (2008) found that Concern Over Mistakes accounted for most of the variance 
in scores on measures of OCD, eating disorders and depression.   
• Critique of the hypothesis 
Rheaume, Freeston, Dugas, Letarte and Ladouceur (1995) found that 
perfectionism was moderately correlated with OC symptoms in a non-clinical 
sample after controlling for responsibility.  Similarly, Wu and Cortesi (2009) 
found that measures of maladaptive perfectionism had significant unique 
correlations with OCD beyond variance contributed by other predictors.  Two 
studies by Coles and her colleagues (Coles, Frost, Heimberg & Rheaume, 
2003; Coles, Heimberg, Frost & Steketee, 2005) produced evidence that “just 
not right” experiences are more related to OC symptoms than they are to other 
domains of psychopathology such as worry, anxiety and depression.    
Whilst some studies support the idea of a unique link between perfectionism 
and OCD, others have contradicted this finding.  Taylor, McKay and Abramowitz 
(2005) found that, whilst the relationship was significant, perfectionism 
cognitions contributed only a small amount to the overall variance in OC 
symptoms.  Some studies have found that perfectionism does not have a 
unique relationship with OCD since it occurred at similarly elevated levels in 
anxiety disorder subgroups as compared with non-anxious controls (e.g. 
OCCWG, 2001, 2003, 2005; Frost & Steketee, 1997; Antony, Purdon, Huta & 
Swinson, 1998).  
Perfectionism also overlaps with other belief domains, and it has been 
suggested that its impact on OC symptoms is mediated by other variables.  For 
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example, an experimental study found that perfectionists reported more 
responsibility for negative outcomes than non-perfectionists (Bouchard, 
Rheaume & Ladouceur, 1999).  A correlational study found that responsibility 
mediated the relationship between perfectionism and OC symptoms (Yorulmaz, 
Koranci & Tekok-Kilic, 2006), suggesting that the contribution of perfectionism 
to OCD may operate in part through its influence on responsibility.  More 
recently, Moretz and Mckay (2009) found that trait anxiety fully mediated the 
relationship between OC symptoms (checking and “just not right” experiences) 
and maladaptive perfectionism.    
1.2.3.6  Intolerance of uncertainty 
• Introduction 
Intolerance of uncertainty has been defined as the excessive tendency of an 
individual to believe that the potential occurrence of negative events in the 
future is unacceptable, irrespective of the probability of their occurrence (Dugas, 
Gosselin & Ladouceur, 2001) and the belief that uncertainty is negative and 
should be avoided (Buhr & Dugas, 2009).  It has also been suggested that it 
involves beliefs about “…the difficulty of functioning adequately in ambiguous 
situations” (OCCWG, 2001, p. 1004), for which reason OCD has been termed 
“the doubting disease” (Ciarrocchi, 1995).  In OCD, the suggestion is that 
compulsive checking relates to the need to achieve absolute certainty that a 
perceived threat has been adequately reduced or eliminated (Rachman, 2002a; 
2002b).   A specific dysfunctional schema underlying OCD which relates to 
inflexibility in situations of uncertainty, newness or change has been suggested 
by Sookman, Pinard and Beauchemin (1994) and Sookman, Pinard and Beck 
(2001).   Beliefs about the unacceptability of uncertainty are hypothesised to 
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lead to avoidance and checking behaviours.  Interestingly, checking behaviours 
have been found to decrease memory certainty and hence may be a counter-
productive strategy which intensifies uncertainty experiences (van den Hout & 
Kindt, 2003a; 2003b).  
• Critique of the hypothesis 
Some research has supported the link between intolerance of uncertainty and 
OCD symptoms. For example, Steketee, Frost and Cohen (1998) found that 
beliefs about certainty were more predictive of OCD symptoms than other belief 
domains measured. Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi and Foa (2003) found that OCD 
sufferers who have predominantly checking symptoms demonstrate greater 
intolerance of uncertainty than non-checking OCD sufferers and non-anxious 
controls.  The latter two groups did not significantly differ from each other.  
Another study found that the intolerance of uncertainty subscale of the 
Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire was strongly correlated with other OCD 
measures (OCCWG, 2001).   
However, a further study by the OCCWG found that the intolerance of 
uncertainty subscale did not distinguish anxious controls from the OCD group 
(OCCWG, 2003), suggesting this belief domain may not be specific to OCD.   
Intolerance of uncertainty has been argued to be a feature of other disorders, 
such as generalised anxiety disorder (e.g. Buhr & Dugas 2009). Holoway, 
Heimberg and Coles (2006) demonstrated that OCD sufferers and people with 
generalised anxiety disorder did not differ significantly from each other on 
intolerance of uncertainty though they did significantly differ from controls.   
 
 19 
 
1.2.3.7  Importance of controlling one’s thoughts  
• Introduction 
This belief domain is defined as the “overvaluation of the importance of exerting 
complete control over intrusive thoughts, images, and impulses, and the belief 
that this is both possible and desirable” (OCCWG, 2001, p. 1003).     Examples 
of beliefs in this domain are “having intrusive thoughts means I am out of 
control” and “if I don’t control my unwanted thoughts, something bad is bound to 
happen” (OCCWG, p. 1003).  It is argued that such beliefs result in 
preoccupation with intrusive thoughts and active attempts to control them 
(Purdon & Clark, 2002). Some research has suggested that the act of 
suppressing thoughts produces a rebound effect, paradoxically increasing their 
frequency (e.g. Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White, 1987).  The resulting failure 
to suppress thoughts is argued to cause distress for those who hold beliefs 
about the importance of controlling thoughts (Purdon & Clark).  Such distress is 
argued to arise both from the unacceptability of the content of the intrusion to 
the individual (for instance because its content has catastrophic personal 
significance for the individual; Rachman, 1997,1998) and because the 
individual’s beliefs mean that his/her positive self-identity has a high stake in the 
notion that one ought to be able to control thoughts (Tolin, Abramowitz, Hamlin, 
Foa & Synodi, 2002). Wells (e.g. Wells & Mathews, 1994; Wells, 1997) posits a 
theory of “metacognition” that suggests OC symptoms relate fundamentally to 
the sufferer’s dysfunctional beliefs about the nature and meaning of thoughts 
(e.g. that they can be controlled). 
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• Critique of the hypothesis 
In support of this hypothesis, a strong correlation between beliefs about the 
importance of controlling thoughts and OC symptoms has been found 
(OCCWG, 2001, 2003, 2005).  This association appears to be specific to OCD 
since this belief domain is endorsed more by people with OCD than anxious 
controls (OCCWG, 2001, 2003, 2005). Research has also found that OCD 
sufferers  appraise negative intrusions as less controllable, more distressing 
and less acceptable than non-clinical controls (Calamari & Janeck, 1998), and 
that people with OCD are more likely to make negative internal attributions 
regarding failure to suppress a neutral thought (e.g. I am mentally weak) than 
non-anxious controls (Tolin, Abramowitz, Hamlin, Foa & Synodi, 2002). A study 
by Abramowitz, Whiteside, Kalsy and Tolin (2003) demonstrated that patients 
with OCD used maladaptive thought control strategies such as worry and 
punishment more often than did non-clinical individuals and those with other 
anxiety disorders. Abramowitz et al concluded that the use of thought control 
strategies such as worry and self-punishment contributes to the maintenance of 
OCD symptoms because such strategies preserve mistaken interpretations of 
intrusive thoughts and evoke increased attempts to suppress the thoughts.  
There is equivocal evidence for the theory that attempted suppression of 
intrusions leads to a paradoxical “rebound effect” of increased intrusions.  For 
instance, studies have found no evidence for an increase in obsessional 
thoughts as a result of thought suppression in non-clinical individuals (Purdon & 
Clark, 2001) and in OCD sufferers (Janeck & Calamari, 1999).  Purdon and 
Clark did, however, find that attempts to suppress were associated with 
increased distress.  Purdon and Clark highlight the impossibility of a task that 
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has an instruction to not think of something, contradicting the notion that it is 
possible which is implicit in the instruction.  They therefore highlight the sense 
of moral failure and lowered self-efficacy that may result when one attempts to 
comply with such an instruction.  However, models of OCD that highlight 
sufferer’s beliefs about thoughts and their desire to control thoughts (such as 
Wells’ (1997) metacognitive theory of OCD) do not fully explain why such a 
belief develops or what might give the belief such power and authority in the 
mind of an OCD sufferer that it can not be easily abandoned. 
 
1.2.3.8 Over-importance of thoughts  
• Introduction 
Over-importance of thoughts has been defined as the belief that “the mere 
presence of a thought indicates it is important” (OCCWG, 2001, p. 1003). For 
example, “having bad thoughts means I am likely to act on them” and “if an 
intrusive thought pops into my mind, it must be important” (OCCWG, 2001).   It 
has been suggested that such beliefs may reflect “thought action fusion” and 
magical thinking (OCCWG, 2001).  “Thought-action-fusion” (TAF) was originally 
defined by Rachman (1993) as the tendency of an individual to assign special 
or exaggerated importance to thoughts and to believe that thoughts and actions 
are inextricably linked.  Moral TAF is the belief that unacceptable thoughts are 
morally equivalent to overt unacceptable actions whilst Likelihood TAF refers to 
the belief that certain thoughts cause particular events, or at least increase the 
likelihood of such events occurring (Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996).  
Berle and Starcevic (2005) suggest that Moral TAF and Likelihood TAF are 
distinct but linked constructs.   
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In OCD, magical thinking refers to the belief that certain thoughts or behaviours 
exert a causal influence over outcomes (Evans, Milanak, Medeiros, & Ross, 
2002) in ways that defy culturally accepted laws of causality (Einstein & 
Menzies, 2004a).  It has been suggested that TAF and superstition may be 
derivatives of magical thinking (Einstein & Menzies, 2004b).  Berle and 
Starcevic (2005) suggest that Likelihood TAF in particular may be a specific 
type of magical thinking given that thoughts are assumed to cause external 
events or increase the probability of their occurrence.  Moral TAF on the other 
hand, does not involve illogical inference of causality but instead an excessive 
sense of the personal relevance attached to the thought.  Berle and Starcevic 
suggest that Likelihood TAF relates more to preventing harm than Moral TAF 
since in Moral TAF there is no harm to prevent other than harm to one’s self 
concept.  Shafran (2005) amongst others (e.g. Amir, Freshman, Ramsey, Neary 
& Brigidi, 2001) suggests that TAF and responsibility beliefs are linked, TAF 
measures showing a moderate association with responsibility measures.   
• Critique of the hypothesis 
In their review of TAF, Berle and Starcevic (2005) report that there is a small but 
robust association between TAF and OCD suggesting that TAF may play a role 
in the disorder.  The association appears to be stronger with obsessional (as 
opposed to compulsive) symptoms, particularly Likelihood TAF (e.g., Rassin, 
Diepstraten, Merckelbach, & Muris, 2001a; Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris, & 
Schmidt, 2001b; Shafran et al., 1996).  A small but significant correlation 
between Moral TAF and obsessive features has also been found (Coles, 
Mennin & Heimberg , 2001).  In an experimental manipulation of TAF in which 
an innocuous thought was linked to an apparently “threatening” consequence, 
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Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris and Spaan (1999) found that after the experimental 
procedure was completed, participants reported increases in discomfort, 
number of intrusions and resistance to the originally innocuous thought.  
Regarding the posited link between TAF and responsibility, moderate 
correlations have been found between measures of these two constructs (e.g. 
Gwilliam, Wells & Cartwright, 2004, Yorulmaz et al, 2004).   
However, some researchers have recently reported that TAF is not specific to 
patients with OCD, and instead may be characteristic of anxiety disorders in 
general (e.g. Abramowitz, Whiteside, Lynam, & Kalsy, 2003c; OCCWG, 2003).  
Berle and Starcevic (2005) suggest that whilst TAF plays a role in OCD it does 
not appear to be crucial in all forms and it is not necessarily specific to OCD.   
They suggest that TAF has a “modest to moderate” relationship with other 
anxiety disorders and depression (p.280).  Berle and Starcevic also reflect that 
there are conceptual aspects of TAF that remain unclear and conclude that 
conceptual difficulties and contradictory results hinder investigations within this 
belief domain.   
 
1.2.3.9 Some general difficulties with cognitive appraisal models of OCD 
1.2.3.9.1 High correlations between belief domains 
 Although cognitive appraisal models of OCD are argued to be amongst the 
most promising theoretical explanations of OCD (Taylor et al, 2006), various 
difficulties exist.  In the commentary above, conflicting evidence regarding the 
mediation of belief domains by other belief domains has been highlighted.  
Taken as a whole, the belief domains are strongly correlated, which suggests 
that each domain may not be as distinct a cognitive construct as currently 
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theorised (Clark, 2004). For example, the OCCWG (2001, 2003) found the 
belief domains measured by the OBQ-87 highly correlated with each other. 
Woods, Tolin & Abramowitz (2004) found the rationally derived 6 factor model fit 
OBQ data poorly.  The OCCWG (2005) later performed an exploratory factor 
analysis on the OBQ-87 in which three factors emerged: 1) responsibility/ threat 
estimation; 2) perfectionism/ intolerance of uncertainty and 3) importance/ 
control of thoughts.  However, the three subscales were still moderately 
correlated in an OCD sample and had higher correlations in a combined 
anxious, community and student control sample (OCCWG, 2005).  When Wu 
and Carter (2008) performed an exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses 
on the OBQ-87 they found a 3 factor solution, but the factors had some different 
item loadings than those of the OCCWG.  Inconsistent item loadings, high 
correlations between domains and factor analysis evidence, all point to the 
existence of an, as yet unidentified factor in OCD.  In this case, it is possible 
that relevant factors may be confounded or ignored in current measures.   
1.2.3.9.2 Lack of improved therapy outcomes 
Another difficulty arises from the cognitive appraisal model’s assertion that 
modifying faulty appraisals and beliefs will lead to a reduction in symptoms 
(Clark, 2005). There is evidence that cognitive therapy for OCD is no more 
effective than behaviour therapy alone (National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 
2005).  Superiority of cognitive approaches compared to the behavioural 
approaches has not been clearly demonstrated (Abramowitz, Taylor, &  McKay, 
2005). Fisher and Wells (2005) re-analysed recent OCD outcome trials using 
standardized criteria for improvement and recovery and similarly found that 
cognitive and behavioural approaches produced similar recovery rates with low 
numbers of patients asymptomatic after the two forms of treatment (16% of 
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patients asymptomatic after cognitive therapy and 21% after behavioural 
treatment).  It has been suggested that one potential reason for the low 
recovery rate in cognitive therapy is that the specific beliefs integral to the 
maintenance and development of OCD have not been identified and are 
therefore not targeted in treatment (Taylor et al., 2006).  
1.2.3.9.3 Social threat and physical threat confounded 
Theories about the evolved nature of the brain and its functions (i.e. 
“evolutionary psychology”) encourage an appreciation of the “prepared” (i.e. 
biased) nature of much information processing (DaSilva, Rachman & Seligman; 
1977) and its primary function of enhancing survival in the face of the threats 
and opportunities in not only the physical but also the social  worlds (e.g. 
Gilbert, 2001).   Cognitive appraisal models have largely failed to explicitly 
differentiate these two sources of threat.  The content of intrusive thoughts often 
includes some element of physical threat (such as thoughts about causing fires 
and infection, losing physical possessions, etc).  Cognitive appraisal models 
based on overestimation of threat tend to focus on the appraisal of physical 
threats rather than social threat and when social threat is included in the notion 
of threat, it tends not to be referred to explicitly as such.  For example, McFall 
and Wollersheim (1979) posited overestimation of threat as a mediator of the 
relationship between perfectionism and OCD. Examples of overestimated 
threats given by McFall and Wollersheim include fears of condemnation, 
punishment, criticism, and disapproval which may result from making mistakes.  
In these examples the threats that are hypothetically overestimated are social 
(as opposed to physical) threats (although this distinction remains implicit in this 
paper) and appear to have some relationship with a construct known as 
“punitive ostracism” (see Williams, 2001).   
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Parrish and Radomsky (2010, p.212) implicitly refer to the role of social threat 
when they suggest that “certain catastrophic beliefs about the potentially 
harmful consequences of not seeking reassurance (e.g., being held responsible 
for illness, injury or other harms) may be specifically related to the maintenance 
of ERS [excessive reassurance seeking] in OCD”.  Here “being held 
responsible” is given as an example of a “harmful consequence”.  The nature of 
the “harm” is not explored, but by implication may presumably involve some 
form of social condemnation or “punitive ostracism”.   
Forms of social threat associated with OCD are the main focus of a recent 
review by Pace, Thwaites and Freeston (2011). Pace et al draw together 
fragmented findings regarding the role that criticism (and other overlapping 
constructs) may play in cognitive models of OCD.   Phenomena that they 
consider overlap with the concept of criticism include hostility, blame, 
“demanding” or “meticulous” parenting and rejection.  They do not explicitly 
label these as social threats.  However, they do highlight the possibility that 
blame (rather than criticism) is actually the phenomenon of interest, which they 
suggest would be the case if punishment follows the OCD-relevant experience 
of criticism.  Punishment following blame commonly involves ostracism, but 
punitive ostracism as a form of social threat related to punishment, 
condemnation and blame has not thus far been considered in the OCD 
literature. 
1.2.3.9.4 Controversies in the conceptualisation of “cognition” 
The information processing paradigm on which the cognitive appraisal model is 
based has attracted some controversy.  The issues involved in debates about 
cognition are complex and often philosophical in nature.  However, in simple 
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terms, two of the concerns involved in these debates are that first, 
biological/affective aspects and second, social aspects of cognition may receive 
insufficient attention in the information processing paradigm upon which much 
cognitive theorising is based.   One important source of criticism is the 
conceptualisation of cognition as “disembodied” (or “brainless”; Gilbert, 1995) 
and the long-running debate regarding the role of affect (e.g. Greenberg & 
Safran, 1984) in cognitive models of psychopathology.  Another critique relates 
to the traditional emphasis in psychology on cognition as a solitary activity that 
“lies behind” language and linguistic expression (Edwards, 1997).  In contrast to 
such a view, “discursive psychologists” such as Edwards conceptualise 
cognition and linguistic expression as inextricably linked in what is viewed as a 
fundamentally “social” activity that is “performative”, “constructivist” and 
“dialogic” (though it may also be viewed as referential and realist as well as 
performative; Bhaskar, 1978).  These two debates (“brainless versus embodied 
cognition” and “semantic/referential versus dialogic/performative cognition”) are 
relevant to a critique of the cognitive appraisal models of OCD and to the 
consideration of the potential utility of a biopsychosocial model of the disorder 
and are considered further in 1 and 2 below.   
1.2.3.9.4.1 Cognition as “brainless” versus embodied (non-conscious and 
affective) 
Whilst Beck’s model does not place importance on unconscious motivations 
and inferential processes, other models of information processing have 
emphasised appraisals by affective systems which are relatively independent of 
conscious cognitive systems (e.g. Zajonc, 1980, 1984).  Such affective 
judgements have been described as unconscious (Leventhal, 1979; Safran & 
Segal, 1990), automatic, fast, inflexible (Zajonc, 1980; Power & Brewin, 1991), 
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and primary (Zajonc).  Conscious cognitive processes, on the other hand, have 
been conceptualised as sequential, slow, effortful and more flexible compared 
to unconscious processes (Power & Brewin) and occurring at a relatively late 
stage of information processing (Shevrin & Dickman, 1980).  Such 
conceptualisations emphasise linearity and lead to debates as to the primacy or 
otherwise of affect.   
 Greenberg and Safran (1984), on the other hand, argued that, rather than 
independent systems, affect and cognition are inevitably combined and 
interactive.  Gilbert (2006, p.150) argues for the importance of placing cognition 
in an evolutionary context, suggesting that “our cognitive systems are both 
activating and activated by evolved [unconscious] systems”.  For example, 
Gilbert (2001 p.18) suggests that threats are processed unconsciously using 
“fast-track” algorithms (e.g. “better safe than sorry”) which can result in 
conscious cognitive distortions such as “jumping to conclusions”.  Such 
processing is non-logical but adaptive since unconscious processing evolved for 
speed and adaption, not rationality (Gilbert, 2001).    Gilbert (2006) also 
suggests that environmental threats may activate threat processing in limbic 
areas such as the amygdala without the intervention of conscious thoughts, but 
equally conscious thoughts can activate the physiological threat-defence 
system in the absence of environmental threat (e.g. Gilbert 1995).  That is  “our 
cognitive systems are not physiologically neutral” but instead thoughts and 
images can trigger biological responses (Gilbert, 2006, p.149).  Gilbert (1995) 
therefore encourages the use of a biopsychosocial (or “holistic”) framework to 
understanding psychopathology underpinned by evolutionary theory. 
 Lewis (2002, p.177) has suggested that from a cognitive neuroscientific 
perspective, disembodied, linear information-processing is an ”inadequate 
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metaphor” for conceptualising cognition and that much cognitive theorising is 
limited by its use of “passive constructs” such as schema.  This “passivity” (i.e. 
the view of schemas as enduring deep “structures” that assimilate and 
accommodate new information (c.f. Piaget, 1960) but not as socially 
“performative” or motivated as such) is contrasted by Lewis with a view of 
cognition that is modelled on notions such as “voice” “performance” and “social 
action” and as such as motivated,  affective and dynamic.  Referencing Thelen 
& Smith, 1994 and Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991), he suggests (p.177) 
that “the richly distributed, reciprocally interactive and self-organizing character 
of neural activity” provides a biologically realistic basis for such 
conceptualisations of cognition.   The notion of cognition as dynamic versus 
passive is discussed further in Section 1.3.10 below. 
What is the relevance of this criticism of “disembodied” information-processing 
paradigms to cognitive appraisal models of OCD?  Models based on beliefs 
about the overestimation of threat view predictions of inability to cope with 
negative outcomes as appraisals that are based on (distorted) rationality/logic.  
As Taylor, Abramowitz and McKay (2007) have pointed out, the cognitive 
appraisal models of OCD have been developed “…largely in a cognitive 
behavioural vacuum”, ignoring the literature on neurobiological aspects of OCD  
(p.24).  The possibility that fast-track affective responses (i.e. felt experiences of 
biological threat responses and/or discomfort of varying levels of intensity in the 
face of certain types of negative outcomes) differentiate OCD sufferers from 
others is not explored in this model.  Lind and Boschen (2009) refer to 
embodied experience when they suggest that the link between responsibility 
beliefs and OC symptoms comes about through the capacity of inflated 
responsibility beliefs to make uncertainty a more uncomfortable experience.  
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However, the emphasis in cognitive appraisal models is less on aversive 
affective experience and much more on appraisals/ beliefs/ schemas.   
Similarly, the “intolerance of uncertainty” models emphasise the unacceptability 
of ambiguity and uncertainty to OCD sufferers, but like most of the other 
models, the embodied aspects of the cognition (e.g. the embodied experience 
of ambiguity as aversive, uncomfortable and threatening) largely remains 
implicit and unexplored.  Cognitive neuroscientists Sachdev and Mahli (2005) 
suggest that certainty about decision making (judgements) can be influenced by 
implicit, rapid, non-conscious and associative processing as well as the 
analytical, explicit, processing made with deliberation that the cognitive 
appraisal models emphasise.    They posit a role for the orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC), suggesting this area produces “gut feelings” (affects based on reward 
history) which help to emotionally bias particular options when faced with 
complex or multiple choices.  Where reward history involves 
punishment/negative feedback, choices are likely to be more affect-laden (for 
instance, they may produce a bodily sense of threat).  They also suggest that 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has an “error detection” role monitoring 
conflicts and signalling (by threat feelings) a “need for change” strategy to avoid 
future repetition of judgement errors when the outcome of a decision/judgement 
is punishing.  Sachdev and  Mahli’s embodied theory suggests a possibility that 
OCD sufferers’ reward history (e.g. for the outcomes of one’s decisions and 
mistakes) has involved high levels of punishment or negative reinforcement, so 
that making decisions may be experienced as intrinsically aversive at a bodily 
level, leading to doubting and thenceforth to checking behaviours.   
Cognitive appraisal models based on “over-importance of thoughts” beliefs may 
similarly be criticised on the basis that they conceptualise cognition as 
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“disembodied”.  For instance, such models do not take account of the possibility 
(as previously discussed above) that if an intrusive cognition causes a 
physiological threat response and uncomfortable, aversive affect in an 
automatic and “fast track” way due to associative learning/conditioning without 
the intervention of conscious appraisal, then the individual may well 
understandably come to regard that intrusive cognition as salient.   
Unlike the other belief domains, embodied aspects of perfectionism have 
received attention within the research literature.  As described in 1.2.3.5., 
sensations described as “not just right experiences” have been linked with both 
perfectionism and OC symptoms.    Coles, Frost, Heimberg and Rhéaume 
(2003) found a significant correlation between NJREs and maladaptive 
perfectionism in a student sample and as mentioned above also found that 
NJREs were more predictive of OC symptoms than symptoms of other anxiety 
disorders.   Mancini, Gangemi, Perdighe and Marini (2008) produced 
experimental evidence suggesting that “trait guilt” influenced the intensity of 
NJREs and also found that NJREs were linked to OCD (as was trait guilt).    
This study therefore links an aversive bodily experience with a moral emotion 
(guilt) and with OC symptoms.   
In Pace, Thwaites and Freeston’s (2011) review of a variety of strands of 
research and theory that suggest a role for criticism in OCD, the authors refer to 
avoidance of disapproval, desire for social acceptability and “distress” (p.15) 
caused by criticism.  However, they do not explore literature relating to the 
possibility of embodied reactions to criticism/blame-related experiences (that is, 
social threat phenomena such as ostracism), nor to theory relating to the neuro-
affective concomitants of such experiences,  nor the evolutionary salience of  
social threat phenomena.  
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1.2.3.9.4.2 Conscious cognition as social (“dialogic”) 
Just as the information-processing models of cognition on which much OCD 
research is based may be criticised as “brainless”, the socially decontextualised 
(or “atomistic” e.g. Taylor, 1985, quoted in Wertsch, 2001) nature of this 
conceptualisation of cognition has also attracted debate.  Conceptualisations of 
cognition in diverse fields such as neuroscience (e.g. Lewis, 2002) and 
discursive psychology (e.g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987), point to the centrality of 
“the social” in understanding human cognition.  For example, there have been 
moves to incorporate the concepts of “social action”, “voicing” and dialogue 
(developed within psycholinguistics e.g. Bakhtin, 1981) into theories of 
language and cognition (e.g. Hermans, 1996).  Such theories emphasise the 
socially performative (as opposed to referential) nature of language and 
(conscious) cognition (e.g. Potter & Edwards, 1990; Edwards, 1997).  
For example, returning to the inflated responsibility models of OCD, these 
emphasise beliefs/ schemas which encapsulate meanings such as “I am 
responsible” and “being responsible for this outcome is unacceptable to me”.  
Such “passive” and “disembodied” (Lewis & Todd, 2004, p.45)) 
conceptualisations of cognition ignore the fact that implicit in concepts such as 
responsibility is a social dynamic.  Dialogic conceptualisations of the self and 
cognition (e.g. Hermans, 1996) suggest a “multi-voiced” self; internal voices 
may potentially be blaming, blamed, accepting of blame or rejecting of blame (in 
the case of moral responsibility); they may also be condemning or forgiving.  
The conceptualisation of cognition as “voice” and “social action” (e.g. Billig, 
2001) also highlights the potential for internal “voices” (and the anticipation of 
such “voices”) to activate “fast-track” embodied responses similar to those 
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threat-defence responses activated by social interaction in the external world 
(such as being blamed and condemned by one’s social group).  For example, 
models based on the “importance of controlling one’s thoughts” belief domain 
(see 1.2.3.7 above) have highlighted the tendency for OCD sufferers to attempt 
to control and suppress thoughts.   This begs the question: why do OCD 
sufferers set themselves the goal of suppressing intrusive thoughts?    If it is the 
case that OCD sufferers require themselves to suppress thoughts (“do not think 
of this”), then this implies that they believe it is both possible and “right” to 
suppress (suggestive of a moral requirement), in contrast to others who appear 
to believe that suppression is neither possible nor right.  As discussed in 
1.2.3.7, the reasons for this high stake in controlling thoughts (i.e. “I shouldn’t 
have these thoughts” and “I should be able to control thoughts”; Purdon & Clark, 
1999) have not been explained.  A dialogic model of cognition emphasises not 
just the content of an appraisal cognitions such as “it is wrong to think these 
thoughts”, but by conceptualising this cognition as an internal self-directed 
“voice”, the tone of voice (e.g. cold and condemnatory) is also highlighted.  If 
this “voice” were also to be experienced by the OCD sufferer as authoritative, 
then this gives rise to the possibility of “fast-track” defensive responding and 
difficulty in dismissing the “voice”.  The theoretical underpinnings of this 
conceptualisation together with its potential to contribute to a biopsychosocial 
model of OCD are discussed further in 1.3.10  below.  
1.2.3.9.5 Explains maintenance but not development of OCD 
A further criticism of the cognitive appraisal model is that it focuses on 
maintaining factors (as these are invariably the target of treatment; Shafran, 
2005) but does not suggest anything about the initial development of these 
beliefs.  Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman and Freeston (1999) have suggested 
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several developmental factors that may impact on an individual’s beliefs about 
responsibility. For instance, they suggest that being given a lot of responsibility 
and/or being scapegoated for negative occurrences (either by parents, or at 
school or elsewhere) may strengthen an individual’s belief about being 
responsible in a wide range of situations as well as increasing appraisals about 
potential negative consequences (e.g. being blamed) that may arise when one 
is responsible.  Being taught strict codes of conduct, being over-protected from 
responsibility and actually or apparently being responsible for a harmful 
outcome are also identified as possible factors in the development of OCD, 
mediated by responsibility beliefs.  Salkovskis et al suggest that the therapeutic 
implications of identifying such developmental factors are limited but suggest 
that a formulation-based approach in which background experiences are 
identified is desirable.    
Frost, Lahart and Rosenblate (1991) found some evidence that the mothers of 
young women high in perfectionism had a particularly “harsh” parenting style. 
Similarly, Shafran and Mansell (2001) suggest that overly critical and 
demanding parents, excessive parental expectations, excessive parental 
indirect criticism and low, inconsistent and conditional parental approval may 
contribute to the development of perfectionism.  Recently, a parenting 
behaviour termed “psychological control” has been identified as being linked to 
the development of perfectionism (e.g. Soenens, Vansteenkiste, Luyten, Duriez, 
and Goossens, 2005).  This term refers to parenting behaviours that involve 
excessive use of manipulative parenting techniques such as guilt-induction, love 
withdrawal and verbal constraint (Barber, 1996).  Psychological control is 
neither about overt conflict nor about manifest judgmental or neglecting 
parenting. Instead, it deals with covert, indirect techniques that are 
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communicated in a subtle, implicit fashion (Barber).   This parenting style, which 
effectively uses the relationship as a method of control, intrudes upon children’s 
thoughts and feelings (Barber).    Results from Soenens et al’s study indicate 
that psychological control is strongly related to adolescents’ maladaptive 
perfectionism, although the conclusions that can be draw are limited by the 
cross-sectional nature of the study.   
The possible role of parental psychological control in relation to OCD has been 
rarely considered or investigated.  However, one study that has investigated the 
link between three types of parenting style (parental acceptance, disciplinary 
firmness, and psychological control) and OC symptoms in a student sample 
found that psychological control was the unique predictor of OC symptoms after 
controlling for depressive symptoms (Aycicegi, Harris, & Dinn, 2002).  Parental 
psychological control was also associated with a broad-spectrum of anxiety and 
depressive symptoms.  Aycicegi et al suggested that parental reprimands and 
controlling statements are experienced as punishing events by children. They 
suggest that if children are not able to predict when the next punishing event will 
occur, the result may be a generally high level of anticipatory anxiety and 
heightened threat-sensitivity. They refer to a classic finding in animal behaviour 
that rats and pigeons will learn spurious associations between random events in 
their environment and subsequent reinforcers (Skinner, 1948). Thus, if parental 
punishment is largely unpredictable, children may develop a superstitious style 
as a coping mechanism which may help to explain the compulsive rituals 
observed in OCD.   Although Aycicegi et al define “parental punishment” in 
terms of reprimands and critical statements, at the core of the concept of 
“psychological control” is “love withdrawal”.  Such guilt-eliciting withdrawal of 
warmth may be communicated in a subtle fashion, hence a child may 
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experience being blamed, condemned and ostracised by his or her parents 
without it necessarily being made clear to the child exactly what he or she has 
done to provoke such punitive ostracism.  
1.2.4 Conclusions of discussion of models of OCD 
Evidence relating to the biological bases of OCD along with behavioural and 
cognitive contributions has been presented.  The six belief domains on which 
most of the cognitive models of OCD are based have been considered. The 
controversies surrounding the conceptualisation of cognition as disembodied 
and socially decontextualised have been highlighted in the above discussions 
as has a move towards developing biopsychosocial models of psychopathology 
that emphasise the interaction of biological, cognitive and social processes.  
Tolin, Woods and Abramowitz (2003) suggest that it may be fruitful to combine 
“top–down” cognitive research (i.e., the study of conscious thoughts, beliefs, 
and attributions) with “bottom–up” research on non-conscious information-
processing and neuropsychological processes in OCD.  Gilbert (1995, 2010) 
has highlighted the explanatory value of evolutionary theory in explaining links 
between the biological, psychological and social aspects of psychopathology.  
Gilbert (1995) emphasizes the notion that the human brain evolved to be highly 
sensitive to the social domain.  He suggests that once this is recognized, then 
the links between the social domain and neurochemistry become more obvious 
and important to understand.    Discussion of these controversies in the 
conceptualisation of cognition highlights the potential usefulness of 
biopsychosocial models of psychopathology (with their emphasis on social 
context and social processes) as opposed to purely cognitive or biological 
models. 
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1.3 Towards a biopsychosocial model of OCD 
A biopsychosocial model of OCD underpinned by evolutionary theory that 
incorporates the social domain (for instance, the notion of social threat) along 
with biological and psychological findings has not yet been fully explicated in the 
literature.    Such a biopsychosocial framework may potentially help to extend 
and illuminate current theoretical models of OCD and draw together fragmented 
OCD-related findings in different academic domains.  The discussion below 
outlines the elements of evolutionary theory that underpin this new 
biopsychosocial approach to understanding OCD. 
1.3.1 The evolution of the need to belong 
Affiliation, co-operation and inclusion in social groups are regarded as having 
been key to our survival as a species, so a strong motivation towards social 
inclusion is adaptive (Macdonald & Leary, 2005).  Ostracised from their group, 
social mammals lack resources to secure their own food, protect themselves 
and to gain mates and the social sustenance they need (Lancaster, 1986) and 
are likely to suffer an early death (Williams & Zadro, 2005).  Such evolutionary 
pressures also applied to early humans (Williams, Forgas, von Hippel & Zadro, 
2005).  MacDonald and Leary (2005) suggest that as humans developed 
increasingly complex cooperative social structures, their levels of 
interdependence also increased, making inclusion crucial for survival across the 
lifespan.  They suggest that this increasing interdependence would have been 
accompanied by new cues of exclusion threat, such as averted eye gaze and by 
appropriate alerting and response mechanisms.  Gilbert (2010) suggests that 
social threats that are particularly arousing are those that have some 
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evolutionary meaning.  In the same vein,  MacDonald and Leary suggest that 
because social exclusion has been such an important threat to survival, 
exclusion cues have the potential to be processed automatically as a basic and 
severe threat to existence (similar to other primitive, “prepared” threats such as 
snakes or spiders). Similarly, Panskepp (1998) has argued for an innate 
motivational system for navigating our needs to be affiliated with others.   
1.3.2 Affiliation and cooperation 
Underpinning theories about the evolution of affiliation and co-operation in 
humans is the concept of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971).  Trivers suggested 
that altruism (defined as an act of helping someone that incurs some cost), 
particularly, though not exclusively, altruism towards non-kin, may have evolved 
because of the potential for the altruistic act to be reciprocated at a later time. 
The altruist is in a vulnerable position because cheating (non-reciprocation) may 
occur.  Trivers argued that this vulnerability set up a selection pressure for a 
protective mechanism, namely moralistic aggression, which is designed to 
inhibit further altruism towards the cheater, to bring pressure to bear on the 
cheater to reciprocate, or ultimately to get rid of the cheater, for instance by 
ostracising him or her.  Trivers suggests that reciprocal altruism requires great 
sensitivity towards the costs and benefits of altruistic acts.  He suggests that the 
concept may also explain the evolution of guilt, which is an emotion that 
motivates the individual to repair misdeeds and to behave reciprocally in future.  
Sympathy and gratitude may also have evolved to regulate the altruistic system 
as may the ability to cheat in subtle ways by mimicking the emotions involved in 
reciprocal altruism (Trivers).  For instance, the expression of sham moralistic 
aggression when no real cheating has occurred may induce reparative altruism 
in others (Trivers).  In turn, evolution has favoured the selection of cheater-
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detection abilities such as detecting and countering sham moralistic aggression 
(Trivers).  The concept of psychological control (Barber, 1996), which involves 
manipulative guilt induction and love withdrawal/ostracism, could be argued to 
be an example of such sham moralistic aggression.  Trivers suggests that 
cognitive abilities required to deal with such complexity may explain the rapid 
increase in hominid brain size during the Pleistocene.  Byrne and Whiten (1988) 
used the term “Machiavellian intelligence” to describe the proposition that the 
human neocortex evolved primarily to deal with social complexity, tactical 
deception and detection of manipulation (as opposed to sensory or technical 
competence). The “social brain hypothesis” encompasses both this view and 
the view that the functions of empathy and co-operation were also important in 
triggering this evolutionary development (Barton & Dunbar, 1997).  Evidence for 
this theory includes evidence from field studies such as the finding that brain 
size correlates with social group size/complexity in primates (e.g. Dunbar, 1992) 
and with frequency of tactical deception in primates (Byrne & Corp, 2004).   
Neuroscience evidence for brain specializations for processing social 
information (such as “mirror neurones”) has also been produced (Dunbar & 
Shultz, 2007).  
1.3.3. Group cohesion, moral codes and ostracism 
Extending the idea of reciprocal altruism to “prosocial behaviour” (cooperation) 
in human groups, Krebbs (2008) discusses the significance of strategic social 
interactions among members of groups.  He suggests that prosocial behaviour 
is motivated by affective experiences including disgust, guilt, shame, gratitude, 
forgiveness, contrition, sympathy, and empathy, and emphasises that such 
feelings have neurological and chemical bases.  Krebbs argues that possessing 
theory of mind abilities enables individuals to attempt to maximize their gains 
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from group living by inducing members of their group to behave in ways that 
enhance their inclusive fitness. Tactics that may induce altruism in others 
include begging; administering rewards and punishments; issuing threats; and 
signalling approval and disapproval through facial expressions and other signals 
that convey respect, gratitude, anger, disgust, and so on.   Like Trivers, he 
acknowledges that the potential for individuals to “cheat” with regard to 
reciprocal altruism must be countered with antidotes to exploitation.  One 
specific antidote is argued to be ostracism.  Krebbs posits that “there is no 
question that dispositions to administer such punishments have evolved in the 
human species” (p. 159).  Similarly, Gruter & Masters (1986) suggest that 
ostracism is used to maintain order, to punish deviance [from moral codes], and 
to increase social cohesion and is likely to have physiological substrates or 
biological functions. Because ostracism from the group is such a serious threat, 
the ability to detect and respond to “the slightest hint of social exclusion” 
(Williams, Forgas, Hippel & Zadro, 2005 p.2) has been essential for humans.   
1.3.4. The role of social emotions 
As described above, for humans, social cohesion and acceptance within one’s 
group requires awareness of moral codes and motivation to adhere to them.  
Both shame and guilt have been highlighted as important “social emotions” 
acting as a “social barometer” providing immediate feedback on our social and 
moral acceptability (Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek (2007) p.347).   Tangney et al 
suggest that these two emotions differ in their focus: in shame-inducing 
situations, one’s focus is on others’ evaluations of the self; whilst in guilt-
inducing situations, one is more concerned about the effect of one’s behaviour 
on others.  Research consistently shows that shame and guilt lead to 
contrasting motivations or “action tendencies” (Tangney et al).  These authors 
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suggest that whilst shame triggers neurochemical changes that are associated 
with deference, defensiveness, self-concealment, interpersonal separation and 
distance, guilt on the other hand corresponds with reparative actions including 
confessions, apologies, and undoing the consequences of the behaviour. There 
is some correspondence between these actions and OCD compulsions such as 
confessing and decontamination rituals (Swedo, Rapoport, Leonard, Lenane & 
Cheslow (1989). 
It has been suggested that shame and guilt have evolved as a result of two 
different forms of evolutionary pressure.  The evolutionary root of shame is 
thought to be a self-focused, social threat system related to competitive 
behaviour and the need to prove oneself valued by and desirable to others 
(Gilbert, 1989). Guilt, however, is suggested to have evolved from an affiliative, 
other-focused system related to the need to be connected and accepted 
(Gilbert, 1998a; Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  Shame enables the individual to 
detect and cope with the threats inherent in competitive/power relationships 
since this painful emotion motivates adaptive defensive responses such as 
social comparison, flight, concealment, submission and appeasement in 
situations in which the presence of more dominant others makes competing 
undesirable and risky (Gilbert, 2003).  Guilt, on the other hand is argued to be 
rooted in an affiliative, reciprocal altruism system in which concern with 
reciprocity and the welfare of others is adaptive.  Whilst failure to hold one’s 
own in competition threatens the individual with decreased social power, failure 
to conform to the moral rules dictated by the particular society to which an 
individual is affiliated may result in ostracism (e.g., Williams, 2001).   This 
implies two forms of social threat; loss of rank and loss of belonging.   
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The importance of these two basic adaptive evolved drives (maintaining rank 
and maintaining belonging/acceptance) is reflected in Leary’s (1957) 
“Interpersonal Circle” model which suggests that basic biological drives interact 
with interpersonal experiences to create a personality. The two basic drives are 
“control” (submission-dominance) and  “affiliation” (love-hate).  In a similar vein, 
Fiske, Cuddy and Glick (2005) and Abele, Cuddy, Judd and Yzerbyt (2008) 
suggest that there are two fundamental content dimensions to social 
judgements: “warmth” and “competence”.  They suggest that warmth is linked to 
morality, affiliation, social acceptance and reciprocity, and posit that this 
dimension is primary, since it is “clearly critical to survival”.  They suggest that 
the competence dimension is linked to skills, achievement and status.   
Social mentalities theory (Gilbert, 1989, 1992, 2000) is derived from the idea 
that we are biologically predisposed to attain certain biosocial goals associated 
with evolutionary “fitness”.  Co-assemblies of attentional, motivational, 
emotional and biological systems steer us towards goals including affiliation and 
social rank.  Gilbert argues that the ranking mentality is activated by issues of 
power, competition and social control and suggests that it is particularly linked 
to depression and shame. Psychological phenomena, such as the need to 
belong to a group, responsibility and guilt, can be viewed as relating to the 
“affiliative” or ”co-operative” mentality which has strong connections with 
reciprocal altruism (Krebs, 2008).  The link between responsibility and OCD has 
been previously discussed.  State and trait guilt has been shown to be 
significantly higher in OCD sufferers than in normal controls (Shafran, Watkins 
& Charman, 1996). Obsessions in OCD have in common their moral theme, 
OCD sufferers viewing their content as “horrific, repugnant, threatening, 
dangerous or all of these” (Rachman, 1997, p.794).  This focus on moral 
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evaluation of obsessions implies that there may be a link with the affiliative 
mentality, “which recruits … evaluations of social situations in terms of …sense 
of belonging and moral interaction” (Gilbert, 1992, p. 139).   
1.3.5. Social threat versus physical threat in OCD 
The concept of evolved unconscious threat-defence systems that steer 
individuals towards biosocial goals may therefore have some relevance to 
understanding OCD.  As previously discussed, the overestimation of threat 
cognitive appraisal models (e.g. Mcfall & Wollersheim, 1979) suggest that 
cognitions overestimating threat trigger compulsive behaviours and 
uncomfortable feelings.  Within some of the OCD literature there is a suggestion 
that, because the immediate focus of the OCD sufferer’s compulsions is fending 
off risks such as fire, burglary, contamination etc, the brain is therefore 
responding primarily to cognitions about physical threat (e.g. Szechtman & 
Woody 2004).  In its identification of “distorted” cognitions relating to moral 
concerns (such as the inflated responsibility model), some cognitive research 
has highlighted the involvement of social threat in OCD though it has generally 
not been labelled as such.  Salkovskis (1985) proposed that OCD sufferers (in 
contrast to other anxiety sufferers) focus more on physical harm coming to 
others rather to themselves.  When individuals are asked “What makes the 
threat so unacceptable?” the answer given tends to relate to a fear of being held 
responsible (Van Oppen & Arntz, 1994, p. 84). In addition, they 
characteristically fear that, as a result of such physical harm, they will be 
blamed and they imagine such blaming would be particularly harsh and 
absolute (Ehntholt, Salkovskis & Rimes, 1999) suggestive of issues of 
condemnation and ostracism (i.e. an affiliative threat as defined above).  McFall 
and Wollersheim (p.335) suggest perfectionism in OCD relates to a desire to 
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avoid criticism and punishment.  Again, this suggested function of perfectionism 
suggests the involvement of social threat and points to fears of exclusion (i.e. 
affiliative threat).   
Cognitive neuroscientists suggest that aversive affect can be unconsciously 
triggered by social signals due to an evolved social threat-defence system 
without the need for intermediate distorted cognitions.   For example, 
MacDonald and Leary (2005) propose that threats to one’s social connections 
are processed at a basic level as a severe threat to one’s safety.  Labelling 
such feelings of threat as “overestimation” and “distortion” may be to ignore the 
possibility that experiencing social threat as highly aversive is normal for a 
human being and that such a response is rooted in adaptation rather than 
maladaptation.  Leitner and Celentana, (1997) suggest that, in trying to 
convince their clients that their perceptions of the world are inaccurate, 
irrational, and distorted, cognitive therapists may risk overlooking the reality of 
social threat within their clients’ social context.  Smail (1987) suggests that in a 
western culture, the healthy adult is constructed as independent and 
autonomous, and that this notion may encourage the view that experiencing 
threat to one’s social connection as highly aversive may be viewed as 
“overestimating” threat and hence contains implicit value judgements.  
Certainly, the cognitive appraisal models overlook the possibility that a “fast 
track” non-conscious processing system may motivate defensive behaviours by 
producing highly aversive threatened feelings in the context of social threat. 
1.3.6 Physiological aspects of the affiliative threat system 
McDonald and Leary (2005) suggest that the social threat-defence systems 
evolved by co-opting existing physical threat mechanisms such as disgust 
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(originally evolved to produce appropriate responses to toxins), pain and 
thermoregulation.  Thermoregulation has been linked to social attachment and 
exclusion.  For instance, Ijerzerman and Semin (2009) suggest that social 
relations are “embodied” such that social closeness is associated with feeling 
emotionally and even physically warm, whilst, conversely, social exclusion 
leaves people feeling colder (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008).   
Social pain theory (Macdonald & Leary, 2005) posits that the affect component 
of the physical pain system provided the foundation for a physiological social 
threat-defence mechanism that contributes to the regulation of social behaviour.  
Social pain is defined by Macdonald and Leary (p. 202) as “a specific emotional 
reaction to the perception that one is being excluded”. Social pain is argued to 
be adaptive because it acts as an “alarm” system for social distance and 
promotes quick reactions in response to social threat by producing highly 
aversive affect.  This notion of a social pain “alarm” is analogous to Spoor and 
Williams’ (2007) “ostracism detection system”.  MacDonald and Leary  propose 
the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) is related to the social pain “alarm” 
system  as a result of its discrepancy detection function.  For instance, where 
the goal is social closeness, then when the discrepancy detection system 
detects excessive social distance, the “alarm” is triggered (in other words, 
subjective feelings of unpleasantness/pain).   These cognitive-affective 
mechanisms are proposed to monitor the social environment for cues indicating 
disapproval, rejection and exclusion.  MacDonald and Leary link this system 
with motivation for moral and acceptable behaviour, suggesting that quick 
action in response to exclusion warnings (e.g. ceasing an offending behaviour) 
is needed to help sustain inclusionary status. Social pain/discomfort mediated 
by the dACC could therefore be viewed as fundamental to steering the 
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individual toward affiliative behaviours and away from violation of moral rules 
and group norms.   
Eisenberger and Lieberman (2004) also explore the notion of social pain from a 
neuroscientific perspective.  They present evidence from animal lesion and 
human neuroimaging studies that physical and social pain (i.e. pain 
experienced upon social injury when social relationships are threatened, 
damaged or lost) overlap in their underlying neural circuitry.   Eisenberger and 
Lieberman suggest that the dACC plays a key role in this overlap between 
physical and social pain, highlighting its role in the distressing “felt 
unpleasantness” (rather than the sensory) component of physical pain.   
Interestingly the ACC has also been identified as playing a role in OCD (e.g. 
Graybiel & Rauch 2000) as previously described in 1.2.1.3.   In a similar vein to 
the theory posited by MacDonald and Leary (2005), Eisenberger and Lieberman  
suggest that this system acts as an alarm system that is responsible for 
detecting cues that might be harmful to survival, such as physical danger or 
social separation, and then for recruiting attention and coping resources to 
minimize threat.  They note that because of its aversiveness, pain captures 
attention, disrupts ongoing behaviour, and motivates action aimed at regaining 
safety and mitigating painful experience.  
1.3.7 Ostracism and affiliative threat 
The fundamental need for inclusion/belonging and the experience of ostracism 
as a painful and salient threat have been discussed above.  Williams (1997, 
2001) differentiates forms of ostracism including (amongst others) punitive 
ostracism.  As has been discussed, punitive ostracism developed as a form of 
“moral aggression” that can be used to punish a “cheater” (in terms of co-
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operation and reciprocity e.g. Trivers, 1971; Krebs, 2008) in order to enhance 
reciprocity in groups (Ouwerkerk, Kerr, Gallucci & Van Lange, 2005).  Thus 
punitive ostracism has been associated with affiliation in contrast to “oblivious 
ostracism”, in which the target is ignored due to being perceived as unimportant 
and low ranking (Williams).  Such a definition resonates with Gilbert’s (1989, 
1992) concept of “social attention holding power” (SAHP) whereby evolved 
capacities for social control via aggression/threat have been added to and 
modified by the need to present the self as attractive to others and thereby 
worthy of attention/investment.  Gilbert links loss of rank and SAHP with 
depression (e.g. Gilbert 1992). 
1.3.8 Ostracism and OCD  
Affiliative threat (i.e. ostracism) and the drive towards social inclusion has rarely 
been explored in relation to OCD.  However, there have been some 
suggestions that there may be a link between OCD and social acceptance/ 
social criticism.  The phenomenology of OCD includes intrusive thoughts that 
commonly centre on possible acts that would offend or harm people and would 
risk social exclusion (Boyer & Lienard, 2006, p. 604). Rachman (1977, p. 794) 
suggests that the content of obsessions for some individuals leads to fears such 
as “if other people knew about my obsessions and/or their content, they would 
completely reject me”.  Ehntholt, Salkovskis and Rimes’ (1999) finding that OCD 
patients expect that if they were to cause harm to others then they would be 
blamed/condemned in a harsh and absolute manner, implies anxiety about 
being ostracised.  The content of obsessions in OCD often relates to fears 
about moral transgressions; it is a widely recognised phenomenon that within 
social groups, transgression of moral rules may result in ostracism (e.g. Haidt, 
2003 p.858).   
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1.3.9 Self-to-other relating, social Information processing, internal working 
models and OCD 
The discussion above highlights the social nature of the human brain, and its 
sensitivity and reactivity to external social signals.  Building on psychoanalytic 
theories that were developed in the early 20th century, Fairbairn (1952) used the 
term “object relations” to refer to the notion that internal social representations 
(“objects”) are formed by the patterns that emerge through repeated 
experiences of the care-taking environment. Object relations theorists 
emphasised the gratification of hunger and libidinal drives as the key motives 
for relating to others.  Building on and adapting this notion, Bowlby (e.g.1969) 
theorized that human social bonds (“attachments”) are a primary instinct rather 
than simply a means of satisfying basic drives.  He proposed that humans have 
evolved to develop internal, experience-based mental representations of the 
self in relation to attachment figures (“Internal Working Models” (IWMs)).  
Studies of young children’s responses to brief separation from attachment 
figures (such as the “strange situation” procedure (Ainsworth, Blehar & Waters 
& Wall, 1978)) provided support for Bowlby’s view.   More recently, support for 
the theory has arisen from neuro-scientific study of pre-motor mirror neurons, 
which Gallese (2005) argues enables primates to understand others’ actions 
through “embodied simulation”.   It is argued that IWMs lead individuals to 
process social information in a biased way (Dykas & Cassidy, 2011).   
Variations in “social information processing” (SIP) (see Crick & Dodge 1994) are 
considered to play a significant role in development because they affect 
individuals’ social and emotional adaptation across the life span.  Crick and 
Dodge (p.81) argue that emotion is “an integrated part of each social 
information processing step”.  In their review of attachment and SIP, Dykas and 
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Cassidy suggest that one important dimension that affects how social 
information is processed is the extent to which the social information could 
cause the individual psychological pain.  That is, the individual may filter out or 
suppress social information depending on the nature of the IWM as a means of 
pre-empting and defending against psychological pain.  Dykas and Cassidy also 
suggest that IWMs generalise to the processing of information relating to peers 
and others in addition to primary attachment figures.   
Although they do not explicitly draw on the notion of IWMs, Parrish and 
Radomsky’s (2010) examination of “excessive reassurance seeking” in relation 
to OCD and depression does relate it to sufferers’ habitual ways of relating to 
others and to a focus on threat in the social domain as well in the “general” 
domain.  They suggest that excessive reassurance seeking occurs both in 
relation to “general threats” such as fire and theft but also in relation to 
perceived social threats such as abandonment and loss of support.  These 
researchers contrasted the reassurance-seeking of OCD and depression 
sufferers, finding that whilst depression sufferers’ reassurance-seeking mainly 
related to themes of self worth such as “Do you still love me?” (p.17), the OCD 
group reported a greater variety of concerns in their reassurance seeking.  
Whilst this often involved “general threats” such as ”Are you sure the stove is 
off?” (p.216), it also included social threat issues such as asking for 
reassurance “that someone’s not mad at me;’ (p.216).  This research implies a 
desire for approval and “sociotropy” (needs for social and interpersonal 
approval, admiration, acceptance and affiliation; Beck, 1983) in both depression 
and OCD, but in depression the emphasis is on approval/disapproval of the self, 
whilst in OCD the emphasis is on moral approval/disapproval.  This is arguably 
along similar lines to the concept of oblivious ostracism (which implies one is 
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rejected for not being sufficiently worthwhile or having insufficient SAHP –see 
1.3.7 above) as opposed to the concept of punitive ostracism (which implies 
that one is rejected as a consequence of breaking moral or social rules).   
In their review of the literature on external criticism and OCD, Pace, Thwaites 
and Freeston (2011) have highlighted a methodological difficulty caused by 
inconsistent definitions of criticism, suggesting that criticism as defined within 
the research literature overlaps with various other constructs including hostility, 
punishment and blame.  It is possible that the concept of punitive ostracism 
encapsulates all of these various constructs and it also allows for a 
biopsychosocial formulation of OCD.  Such a holistic formulation has the 
advantage of making links between biological, psychological and social factors 
(that is, it helps us to understand how phenomena occur and interact), but in 
addition, by relating these phenomena to evolutionary theory (e.g. Barton and 
Dunbar, 1997), we potentially can begin to gain some understanding of why 
these phenomena occur.  For example, research into ostracism suggests that 
ostracism is processed at a fundamental biological level (e.g. Eisenberger &  
Lieberman’s (2004) neuroscientific research into the “social pain” and its 
relationship to rejection), which in turn suggests that thoughts, feelings, 
behaviours and outcomes that have learned associations with accountability, 
blame and ostracism may elicit feelings of threat in a “fast track” and automatic 
manner.   
1.3.10 Self-to-self relating, dialogism, self-condemnation and OCD 
Since obsessions occur in the private domain of the individual’s mind, it could 
be argued that a thought should not trigger a physiological affiliative threat 
system.  However, models of cognition that emphasise “voice” potentially throw 
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light on how cognition and physiological threat systems may interact and this 
idea has been taken up within the discipline of cognitive neuroscience.   Within 
cognitive neuroscience, there is a commitment to understanding the brain as 
the basis of cognition.  As noted in 1.2.3.9.4.1 above, the distributed, 
reciprocally interactive and self-organizing character of neural activity provides 
an alternative model to the view of cognitive processing as linear sequences 
performed by “symbol-processing machines” (Lewis, 2002).  Lewis (Lewis, 
2002; Lewis & Todd, 2004) suggests “passive” disembodied cognitive 
constructs such as schemas (for example, self-schemas in the form of 
declarative beliefs such as “I am unworthy” – see p.9) may usefully be refined 
using a more dynamic model in which embodied voices inter-animate each 
other.  Voicing, construed as action, points toward the brain regions and 
subsystems directly involved in planning and generating voluntary speech.  
Lewis proposes that one remains in a continuous dialogical relation with an 
“anticipated, almost-heard other” (Lewis & Todd, 2004, p. 49).  He speculates 
that speech-like plans are generated in response to the anticipated “inchoate” 
other (i.e. at the level of gist) and more articulated inner speech activates pre-
motor circuits and the motor cortex respectively.  He also suggests the 
answering voice in this internal dialogue can be “heard” through feedback from 
the auditory circuits.  Anticipation of “voices” forms a process of perceptual 
modelling and action-planning.  That is, the brain is viewed as generating 
actions and perceiving events that fit an anticipated future just ahead in time 
(e.g. an anticipated “voice”).  This concept of cognition as voices in active 
dialogue has something in common with “relational schema” as conceptualised 
by Baldwin (1997) who suggests that rules of self-inference derive in large part 
from expectancies about the contingencies of interpersonal interaction.  He 
 52 
 
suggests, for example, that changing an individual’s attributional style may 
“require changing the person's private audience” (Baldwin, p.333).  Although 
Young‘s concept of “schema modes” (Young, Klosko & Weishaar, 2003) has 
been criticised as lacking clear theoretical and scientific embedding 
(Lobbestael, van Vreeswijk & Arntz, 2007) it similarly offers some suggestion 
that “people have different sides of themselves; every person includes a multi-
vocality of modes” (Rafaeli, Bernstein & Young, 2011),  However, only dialogical 
theories of self explicitly draw upon psycholinguistic and discursive 
psychological theories of cognition as multi-voiced and “socially performative”.  
Lewis (2002) proposes that both the OFC and the ACC, with their close 
connections with the limbic system, may be involved in attending to potential 
rewards and threats inherent in inchoate speech and driving behavioural plans 
(including internal speech).  Schore (1994, 1997) has also emphasized the role 
of the OFC as “valence-tagging” perceptions along a reward-punishment 
continuum. According to Schore, the right OFC produces an affectedly charged 
gist-like sense of an interpersonal respondent based on expectances from 
many past interactions (i.e. comparable to the “internal working model” originally 
proposed by Bowlby, 1969).  Schore suggests that this gist-like image is the 
fundamental arbitrator of emotion regulation and it sets the rest of the brain in a 
mode of readiness based on preconscious expectations.  The internal sense of 
a warm soothing parent permits rapid emotional equilibration, whereas the 
expectation of rejection or criticism promotes defence or withdrawal.  In other 
words, this gist like sense of “the other” may impact on the individual’s threat-
defence system (which includes phenomena such as social pain, and social 
warmth/coldness).   
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Within the growing (if fragmented) literature examining the importance of “self-
to-self” relating in relation to psychopathology, constructs such as self-criticism, 
self-blame  and associated concepts such as guilt and shame have been 
considered.  The latter two concepts (that is, guilt and shame) could potentially 
be used to describe elements of experience that are physiological and 
emotional in nature and/or consist of internal self-blaming or self-critical internal 
dialogues.  Gilbert  and Irons (2005 p. 271) have suggested: “Self-criticism can 
act as an internal hostile signal.   It is like having a self-monitoring system that is 
constantly looking for weaknesses and condemning the self”.  Gilbert and Irons 
(p.271) link this experience to shame, suggesting it can form the basis of 
“…internal harassment” which is described as “…the constant, repetitive 
experience of being (internally) attacked/condemned and feeling shamed”.  
Gilbert and Irons (p.271) suggest the impact of such shame-provoking self-to-
self relating is similar to the impact of a subordinated animal being harassed by 
a dominant animal.  They also suggest such self-to-self relating (that is, self-
criticism) is linked to what the social rank mentality (Gilbert, 2000 – see 1.3.4 
above) which is viewed as “rooted in role-forming mentalities and defensive 
strategies” (Gilbert and Irons, 2005, p.273).  In a similar vein, Gilbert (2000) 
links this mentality with the dominant-submissive pole of Horowitz and Vitkus’s 
(1986) interpersonal model and with loss of status, which in turn is based on 
Leary’s (1957) interpersonal circle (also mentioned in 1.3.4 above).  This 
interpersonal circle model is derived from the notion that biological drives 
interact with interpersonal experience to build a “personality” that is reflected in 
predominant interpersonal behaviours (Benjamin, 1996).  As previously 
discussed, in Leary’s model, interpersonal behaviours can be aligned along two 
basic poles for interpersonal relating, one relating to affiliation (friendliness, 
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love-hate) and one to control (power, status, submission-dominance) 
(Benjamin).  In terms of Gilbert’s social mentalities theory, these two poles 
appear to overlap with the affiliative mentality and the ranking mentality 
respectively.    The concept of self-criticism has thus been linked with a 
submission-dominance or ranking internal dynamic, and also with “self-oriented 
perfectionism” (e.g. Shafran & Mansell, 2001) which in turn has been linked with 
depression in patient samples (e.g. Hewitt, & Flett, 1991).  Self-criticism 
therefore appears to have been theoretically linked mainly to ranking/ control/ 
submission-dominance issues and thereby to issues such as depression and 
shame. 
 The contention of this study is that in OCD sufferers, threat-focused self-to-self 
relating may be mainly linked to the affiliative/ “in-group versus out-group” 
domain, wherein inclusion/acceptance (in the interpersonal domain) depends on 
establishing oneself in the minds of others as reciprocal, co-operative and 
moral; and wherein rejection (“punitive ostracism” / condemnation) may be used 
as a punishment for breaching moral rules.    This is in contrast to the 
ranking/power/ “up-rank versus down-rank” interpersonal domain, wherein 
maintenance of status depends on establishing SAHP in the minds of others.   It 
is possible that within the intra-personal domain “self-condemnation” may be 
particularly relevant to OCD.  This study also contends that self-condemnation 
is linked to the experience of punitive ostracism.  Punitive ostracism in a social 
arena (as defined by Williams, 2001) involves an act of blame for some form of 
perceived immoral behaviour that is signalled by personal acts of rejection (not 
making eye contact, not speaking, withholding friendly and warm social signals 
(for instance, not smiling, not offering empathy or sympathy to signs of distress 
etc.) as well as acts of group exclusion (which may range from excluding 
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someone in the group from a conversation, to excluding someone from society 
such as imprisonment.)  As a hypothetically internalised form of punitive 
ostracism, it is proposed that self-condemnation involves internal experiences 
such as an emotional coldness and low empathy towards the self as a form of 
punitive reaction to some perceived form of immoral behaviour (whether that be 
internal or external).   
Low self-forgiveness/self-condemnation may have some conceptual overlap 
with self-blame.  Self-blame has sometimes been divided into two types: 
“behavioural self-blame” and “characterological self-blame”, the latter having 
been linked with depression (Janoff-Bulman, 1979).  Behavioural self-blame has 
also been described as consisting of self-attributions that are internal, unstable 
and  controllable as opposed to characterological self-blame, which is viewed 
as internal, stable and uncontrollable (Graham & Juvonen, 1998).  Whilst the 
latter has been described as being linked with shame and a tendency to 
withdraw and give up, the former has been described as being linked with 
increased guilt and increased motivation to redress wrongs (Graham & 
Juvonen).    Andrews (1998) reports that shame has been linked with 
characterological self-blame, and behavioural self-blame to guilt.  However, the 
notion that shame and guilt relate exclusively to the domains of the self and of 
behaviour respectively has been questioned (Andrews).  Guilt has been 
described in evolutionary terms as serving a signal function by way of “mild 
often unconscious anxiety” (Greenwald & Harder, 1998).  To avoid feeling this 
discomfort, the individual is motivated to change behaviours and thoughts that 
might be harmful or immoral and often to attempt some form of reparative 
behaviour.  However, whilst guilt experiences are generally conceptualised as 
pertaining to events that have occurred, the focus of attention in OCD is often 
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on events that may occur in future.  Shame is also sometimes viewed as a 
motivator towards certain behaviours, but the focus of the behaviours is aimed 
at reversing the damage to one’s status or good name (Lansky, 1995) rather 
than redressing some form of moral harm.   
There is also some link between the concept of different forms of inner self-to-
self relating and that of “inner working models” (IWMs), introduced in 1.3.9 
above, which were described by Bowlby (1969, 1973) as internal 
representations of “self” and “other” that originally develop as reflections of a 
child’s interactions with their care-giver.  As previously explained, these are 
hypothesised to lead to conscious or tacit expectations of attitudes by others in 
relation to the self particularly by attachment figures but also others in the wider 
social context (Guidano & Liotti, 1983).  IWM theory focuses on conscious and 
unconscious expectations of how external others will relate to the self, rather 
than expectation of how an internal “voice” or “part” will relate to the self.  Bhar, 
2004 and Bhar and Kyrios, 2000 draw on Guidano and Liotti’s conceptualisation 
of IWMs in relation to OCD in their development of the construct “self-
ambivalence”.  Self-ambivalence describes the degree of uncertainty in and pre-
occupation with one’s self-worth, which was found to be linked with OC 
symptoms after controlling for depression, but also with other anxiety disorders. 
The measure they developed for this research (the Self-Ambivalence Measure) 
did not have subscales to distinguish different domains of self, such as the 
morality domain, which Doron and Kyrios (2005) suggest may be particularly 
relevant to OCD, and which is arguably the domain also emphasised by the 
concept of self-condemnation/low self-forgiveness.   
Another point of discussion regarding self-condemnation is its dialogic quality, 
since dialogism theory forms part of the conceptual basis for this study.  The 
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links between OCD and responsibility have previously been discussed within 
the context of the traditional cognitive appraisal model.  It has been highlighted 
that a potential criticism of this model is that it conceptualises cognition as static 
and non-social.  Notions such as “self-criticism”, “self-forgiveness” and “self-
condemnation” emphasise the idea of two “parts” in dialogue, the part that is 
criticising/forgiving/condemning interacts in a pseudo-social manner with the 
part that is criticised, forgiven or condemned.  The notion of cognitions/beliefs 
about excessive responsibility does not in essence say anything about how 
such thoughts evoke anxiety.  It is argued here that, implicit in the literature on 
responsibility beliefs is the notion of forgiveness.  If one’s inner self-to-self 
dialogue (explicit or gist-like) is “You are responsible but I forgive you” and the 
tone of this self-relating is warm, attuned to one’s distress and sympathetic to it, 
then it seems likely that one would be less likely to dread the possibility of 
making a mistake compared to someone whose anticipated internal voice is 
cold, unsympathetic and conveys “I will never forgive you if you make a 
mistake”.  This conceptualisation of cognition as dialogic and pseudo-social 
allows for the possibility that anticipation of a cold non-forgiving voice may 
trigger the threat-defence system, causing discomfort and conscious or 
unconscious anxiety.  The notion of dialogism is therefore central to the 
biopsychosocial model of OCD proposed here.    
1.4 Conclusions 
Evidence for the role of biology, conditioning and cognition in OCD has been 
presented.  Research in these fields has gone some considerable way towards 
improving our understanding of this condition.  However, competing theories, 
fragmented bodies of evidence and semantic and conceptual problems all 
hinder our understanding of the disorder. There has been relatively less 
 58 
 
attention paid to the role of “the social” in the development and maintenance of 
OCD and as yet a biopsychosocial model of OCD had not been fully formulated.   
In this introduction, it has been suggested that theories and evidence from 
diverse areas of knowledge that have not yet been applied to OCD may 
contribute to a biopsychosocial model which has potential to improve our 
understanding of the condition.  For example, areas of the brain that have been 
highlighted as having involvement in OCD have also been identified as having 
involvement in social pain, valence tagging of internal “voices” and in the 
inclusionary-status alarm system.  Dialogism theory (wherein thinking is 
described as a “social” activity which may trigger the social threat system 
without obvious external cause) may throw light on the OCD-related 
phenomenon of the desire to control thoughts and importance of thoughts. That 
is, it suggests a mechanism whereby a predicted “gist-like” unforgiving and 
condemning voice may trigger a bodily experience of aversion and threat.   
Heightened sensitivity to ostracism, particularly punitive ostracism, provides a 
potential explanation for the OCD sufferer’s vigilance to moral rule breaking (i.e. 
issues of moral accountability).  Such vigilance potentially has roots in a desire 
to pre-empt moral aggression and ostracism (either by others’ or by one’s own 
internal, anticipated, unforgiving “voice”) and this in turn may have roots in 
evolutionary adaptations to group living such as reciprocal altruism. The OCD 
sufferer may potentially have experienced frequent sham moral aggression (i.e. 
non-contingent punitive ostracism such as the “silent treatment”) by carers and 
peers.  Sham moral aggression appears to be an important aspect of the 
construct termed “psychological control” (e.g. Barber 1996) which involves 
verbal constraint, blaming/ guilt induction (scapegoating) and love withdrawal/ 
ostracism.    Psychological control is essentially manipulative such that 
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punishment (ostracism) and approval have inconsistent contingencies.  Such a 
variable negative reinforcement schedule may increase behavioural attempts to 
preclude any possibility of moral rule breaking/ mistakes and associated 
ostracism/love withdrawal (i.e. perfectionism).  In addition, if one has been 
frequently blamed (i.e. held responsible) and punished through ostracism, then 
it would seem very possible that one may come to develop a (pre-emptive) 
inflated belief about being responsible.  
 
1.5 The current study 
The literature review has presented an argument for incorporating theories of 
social affiliation, ostracism, social pain, social information processing and 
dialogism into a biopsychosocial model of OCD.  Based on this argument, the 
current study explores whether punitive ostracism experiences (henceforth 
termed POE which consists of memories, attributions and self-condemnation) 
explain some of the variance in the relationship between obsessive beliefs and 
OC symptoms.  That is, POE variables are argued to covary with obsessive 
beliefs and to also be predictive of OC symptoms (controlling for obsessive 
beliefs) and thus help to explain the relationship between them.  The study also 
pilots a new measure of ostracism intent attributions.  
The thee cognitive phenomena classified under the rubric POE occur on 
different “levels” of cognition, but are argued to   reciprocally impact on each 
other in a causal fashion.  That is, memories of punitive ostracism in childhood 
(viewed as (social) trauma memories) are argued to be related to a social 
information processing bias reflected in a threat-related “better safe than sorry” 
tendency to attribute punitive ostracism to ambiguous social situations.  
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Memories of punitive ostracism are also argued to be linked to a dialogical inner 
relationship that is condemning in nature and this is conceptualised as having 
resulted from a process of internalisation of the punitively rejecting messages 
received from external others (c.f. Vygotsky, 1978). An ongoing tendency to 
attribute ambiguous social situations as punitively rejecting may further 
reinforce the inner dialogical relationship between the condemned self and a 
distancing/condemning “other”.  Threat experiences caused by such 
attributional bias may also lead to further laying down of social trauma/threat 
memories.     In addition, because self-condemnation is argued to also be 
experienced as a (pseudo) “social threat“, experiencing inner condemnation that 
cannot be resisted may also cause biased attributions in external social 
situations and experiences of not forgiving oneself may be laid down in memory 
as aversive experiences.    
Figure 1: Hypothetical relationships between study variables 
 
 
OC 
Symptoms 
Obsessive 
Beliefs 
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It is suggested that the existence of an authoritarian, punitively rejecting “part” 
within the individual’s “internal space” (c.f. Hermans, 2001), which is reflected in 
a tendency to self-condemn, may motivate the individual to control thoughts 
(since both internal and external events may be morally condemned by an 
internal punitive “voice”) and to regard thoughts as an important source of moral 
accountability and threat.  Memories of psychological control may be related to 
perfectionist beliefs since children who have been controlled by non-contingent 
punitive love/affiliation withdrawal (by parents and/or peers) may come to 
believe that perfection is expected by (powerful) others and therefore is 
possible, and that others will only accept them if they are perfect and conversely 
will condemn and ostracise them if they are less than perfect.  Intolerance of 
uncertainty may also have a relationship with experiences of psychological 
control.  That is, the uncertainties of a social milieu characterised by 
manipulative punitive ostracism (and its associated inconsistent and 
unfathomable contingencies) are likely to be highly stressful, anxiety-provoking, 
and difficult to tolerate for those who (particularly as relatively powerless 
children) have been subject to such behaviours. A bias towards experiencing 
others (in ambiguous situations) as holding one morally to account, blaming and 
condemning may help to explain a belief that one has pivotal responsibility.  
This “better safe than sorry” functioning (i.e. tending to over-interpret social 
threat) may also help to explain overestimation of threat beliefs.  Also, having 
an internal “voice” that holds one to account, blames one and punishes one (i.e. 
self-condemnation) may be part of the responsibility belief phenomenon (i.e. the 
difference between these two variables may be mainly conceptual).  The 
importance of identifying the potential contribution of self-condemnation in this 
instance is mainly clinical as it may suggest new targets for interventions.    
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Given the contention outlined above that the three POE variables causally 
impact on each other, it is argued that they will all make a significant 
contribution to the variance of OC symptoms and to the variance of Obsessive 
Beliefs.  Developing beliefs (as a result of one’s social threat experiences) that 
the world is threatening, that one is pivotally responsible, that one should (but 
cannot) control thoughts, that uncertainty is intolerable, that one should (but 
cannot) be perfect, may all reinforce the tendency to self-condemn, to over-
interpret ambiguous ostracism as punitive, and to lay down further threat 
memories. 
This study therefore hypothesises that the three POE variables significantly 
contribute to the variance in OC symptoms after controlling for the three factors 
of the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-44 (OBQ-44) (Importance of 
Thoughts/Importance of Controlling thoughts; Perfectionism/Intolerance of 
Uncertainty; and Responsibility/Overestimation of Threat; OCCWG, 2005;).   
It is also hypothesised that three POE variables make a significant contribution 
to the variance of the factors of the OBQ-44.   
Confirmatory evidence in support of these hypotheses is argued to potentially 
provide the basis for incorporating the cognitive appraisal model into a broader 
biopsychosocial framework, which would provide the basis for further research.  
The study is also argued to be potentially clinically significant since attributional 
tendencies, social threat memories and condemnatory self-to-self relating could 
potentially be targets for clinical interventions in OCD. Such interventions may 
include compassion-focused approaches (e.g. Gilbert 2010) and dialogical 
psychotherapy (e.g. Hermans & Dimaggio, 2004). 
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1.5.1 Research Aims  
The aim of the research was to first develop and pilot a new measure of intent 
attributions in ambiguous ostracism situations since no measure relevant to this 
research question previously existed.  Social cognition theorists suggest there 
are individual differences in activation of an ostracism detection system and in 
social information processing (SIP) and also differences in the intent of those 
who ostracise others.  Measuring intent attributions within hypothetical 
ambiguous ostracism situations is potentially one means of assessing SIP 
biases and degree of activation of the ostracism detection system.   
The main aim was to investigate the hypothesis that three POE variables 
(memories, attributions and self-to-self relating) confound the relationship 
between obsessive beliefs and OC symptoms.    
1.5.2   Research Questions 
1.5.2.1 Pilot study research questions: 
• Part One: Can ostracism intent attributions be measured validly and 
reliably?  
• Part Two: Is an adapted version of the Parental Psychological Control 
Scale-Youth Report (Barber, 1986) reliable over time? 
1.5.2.2 Main study research questions 
• Do the three POE variables (memories of psychological control by 
parents and peers (PCSt); punitive intent attributions (SSQp)  and self-
condemnation (HFS)) predict Obsessive Beliefs variables (Importance of 
Thoughts/Importance of controlling thoughts (I/CT); Perfectionism/ 
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Intolerance of Uncertainty (P/C); and Responsibility/Overestimation of 
Threat (R/T))? 
• Controlling for Obsessive Beliefs variables, do POE variables 
significantly predict OC symptoms?  
• Do POE variables significantly interact with obsessive belief variables in 
their impact on OC symptoms? 
1.5.3 Hypotheses 
1.  POE variables will significantly predict Obsessive Beliefs (R/T; P/C and 
I/CT). 
2.  POE variables will significantly predict Obsessive Symptoms (OCI-R) 
controlling for Obsessive Beliefs. 
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2. Method 
2.1 Design 
The ontological stance of the study is based on the scientific assumptions of 
empiricism (regularities and causal relationships exist in the world and can 
become known to us through observation) and its epistemological stance is that 
of positivism (knowledge produced by the study is factual, objective knowledge, 
rooted in logic, unaffected by the researcher and generalisable).  The logic of 
enquiry that it employs is hypothetico-deductive; that is, it is driven by 
hypotheses drawn from theories which the research can potentially falsify by 
testing the observable data.  It takes into account existing theories, and extends 
them by incorporating knowledge from other areas. The variables used are 
latent and subjective in nature, but the research makes the assumption that 
they can be objectively, reliably and validly measured using validated, 
standardised measures which operationalize the variables as scores computed 
from the answers to questions.   
The study is quantitative and the design consisted of a longitudinal test 
validation across two time points and a cross-sectional, correlational survey.  It 
used a non-clinical sample of convenience of sufficient size to have appropriate 
statistical power and generalizability to the population.  All the data were 
collected using online questionnaires.  Survey data were analysed using 
correlational analyses. 
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Variables involved in the study are as follows (details of instruments are given in 
2.6): 
Criterion (dependent/outcome) variable: 
• OC Symptoms measured by the OC Inventory (revised) (OCI-R). 
Predictor (independent) variables: 
• Obsessive Beliefs measured by the three factors of the Obsessive 
Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-44) measured by Responsibility/Threat 
(R/T), Perfectionism/Intolerance of Uncertainty (P/C) and 
Importance/Control of Thoughts (I/CT). 
• Punitive Ostracism Experiences (POE) which consists of : 
o Self-condemnation measured by the Heartland Forgiveness Scale 
(HFS). 
o Memories of being psychologically controlled measured by the 
total score (PCSt) of three revised subscales of the Parental 
Psychological Control Scale-Youth Self-Report (revised): Mother’s  
Psychological Control; Father’s Psychological Control and Peers’ 
Psychological Control. 
o Punitive Ostracism intent attributions in ambiguous ostracism 
situations (SSQp) measured by the new measure entitled the 
Social Situations Questionnaire (SSQ).  
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2.2 Data analysis  
GPower version 3.0.10 was used for power analyses.  SPSS Version 17 was 
used for all other analyses.   
 
2.3 Sample size issues 
As no previous research using this combination of variables has been carried 
out, assumptions about effect size based on previous studies could not be 
accurately made.  For the Pilot Study, reliability (correlation) analyses of Time 
One and Time Two responses required a sample size of at least 122 to achieve 
80% power with a type one error probability of p<.01.  In the main study 
regression analyses, to achieve 80% power with a type one error probability of 
p<.05 and potential effect sizes that are small (.02), half way between small and 
medium (.065) and medium (0.15), 602, 189  and 85 participants respectively 
are needed.  The research aimed to strike a balance between a realistic sample 
size that could be achieved during the study and the possibility of relatively 
small effect sizes, and therefore aimed to achieve a sample size of at least 189.  
Participant responses from the Pilot Study were also included in Main Study 
analyses to maximise the power of the research.   Post hoc power analyses 
were calculated and are reported in the results section.   
2.4 Ethical considerations 
Participants were recruited from the community.  Limited demographic 
information was collected and individuals with current or previous mental health 
histories were not excluded.  Ethical approval was sought and received from the 
University of Hull.  Measures were chosen that did not include questions about 
participants’ risk, but which did contain personal questions they could potentially 
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have experienced as intrusive.  This risk was mitigated by the fact that the study 
was an online survey (as opposed to face-to-face interviews).  It was felt that 
there was a possibility that some participants may feel concerned about their 
mental health having completed the questionnaires and that some of the 
questions could potentially touch on upsetting memories for some participants. 
The information sheet advised participants to contact their G.P. should they 
have such concerns about their health and the contact details of the chief 
investigator, who is a qualified clinical psychologist, were also given.  
2.5 Participants 
A community sample of convenience was used.  Participant data from Time 
One of the Pilot study were entered into the Main study.  Participants were 
required to be aged 18 or over; no other exclusion criteria were used.   
Participants in the Pilot Study were 141 adults aged between 18 and 68 
(M=37.85 S.D. = 13.9).  109 were female and 29 were male.    Of these 141, 
109 submitted Time Two questionnaires (77.3%).   
Participants in the Main Study were 330 adults aged between 18 and 68 (mean 
age =32.6; S.D.= 13.6).  234 (70.9%) of these were female (mean age =32.7, 
S.D. = 13.4).  96 (29.1%) were male (mean age =32.3; S.D.= 14.1). 
2.6 Measures: 
• Heartland Forgiveness Scale “HFS” (Thompson et al 2005) (Forgiveness 
of Self subscale)  
Heartland Forgiveness Scale measures three components of dispositional 
forgiving (forgiveness of self; forgiveness of others and forgiveness of 
situations). The HFS consists of 18 items, with three six-item subscales. Items 
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are measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = almost always false of me; 
7=almost always true of me), with higher scores reflecting higher levels of each 
form of forgiveness. Only the self-forgiveness subscale was used in this study.  
Cronbach’s alpha for this subscale was reported as .72-.75 by Thompson et al. 
Items include “I hold grudges against myself for negative things I’ve done” And 
“With time I am understanding of myself for mistakes I’ve made”.   In the 
present study, items were reverse scored in order to give a measure of low self-
forgiveness (henceforth described in this thesis as “self-condemnation”). 
• Obsessional beliefs questionnaire “OBQ” (OCCWG, 2003, 2005): 44 item 
version.  
This self-report measure was developed to assess 6 major cognitive domains 
thought by experts in the field to be OCD-related.  Items were rationally derived 
to reflect these 6 cognitive domains, namely responsibility; importance of 
thoughts, control of thoughts, threat estimation, tolerance for uncertainty and 
perfectionism.  An 87-item version was initially developed (OCCWG, 2003), in 
which participants rate their agreement with each statement using a 7-point 
Likert scale.  For this scale, Cronbach’s alpha varied from .71 to .93 for 
subscales across samples and test-retest reliability varied between 0.75 and 0.9 
across subscales (OCCWG).  Evidence supporting the criterion-related validity 
and convergent validity of the scale was presented.  Some support for 
discriminant validity was also produced.  A high level of correlations between 
the subscales was found.  A subsequent analysis (OCCWG, 2005) produced a 
44-item empirically-derived scale based on exploratory factor analysis of the 
original 87-item scale and this 44-item scale was used in the current study.  The 
44-item OBQ significantly correlates with the OCI-R (r=.59, n=787: Wu, 
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personal communication).  Wu and Carter (2008) also provided further evidence 
for the OBQ’s specificity as a predictor of OCD.    A factor analysis of the 44-
item OBQ suggested 3 factors reflecting (1) Responsibility and threat 
estimation, (2) Perfectionism and intolerance for uncertainty, and (3) Importance 
and control of thoughts (OCCWG, 2005).   Examples of items are “When I see 
any opportunity to do so, I must act to prevent bad things from happening.” and 
“Things should be perfect according to my own standards.” 
• Parental Psychological Control Scale-Youth Self-Report “PCSt” (Barber, 
1996) (adapted).    
Barber based his scale on the Psychological Control Scale of the Child Report 
Parental Behavior Inventory (CRPBI) (Schaefer, 1965). It contains items 
pertaining to invalidation of feelings, constraining verbal expression, personal 
attack (blaming) and love withdrawal.  Factor analysis demonstrated these 
belong to one over-riding factor (psychological control).  The scale has 8 items 
that are scored using a 5-point Likert scale.  The scale has demonstrated good 
internal consistency (ranging between .82 and .86; Luyckx, Soenens, 
Vansteenkiste, Berzonsky & Goossens, 2007).  A version of the parental 
psychological control scale used by Arim and Shapka (2007) to measure peer 
psychological control (α= .85) was also used. In this exploratory study, the 
scores for each of mother’s, father’s and peer group psychological control were 
of interest as well as combinations of psychological control scores.  This was 
because a lack of prior research made it difficult to predict which of these 
groups (if any) was most influential in relation to OC symptoms, and/or whether 
there was an additive effect of being psychologically controlled by more than 
one source. Test-retest reliabilities in this study were r= .901 for mother’s 
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psychological control, r=.876 for father’s psychological control, r=.742 for peers’ 
psychological control and r=.901 for total psychological control score.  
Examples of items include “My mother stopped talking to me until I pleased her 
again” and “My father was less friendly with me if I did not see things his way” 
• Revised Obsessive Compulsive Inventory “OCI-R” (Foa et al 2002). 
 This scale has 18 items rated on a 5-point Likert scale.  Cronbach’s alpha was 
between .81 and .91 for the different groups to which it was administered (Foa 
et al).  Test-retest reliability was demonstrated in Foa et al’s study as was the 
measure’s convergent and divergent validity.  Items include “I check things 
more often than necessary.” and “I sometimes have to wash or clean myself 
simply because I feel contaminated.” 
• Social Situations Questionnaire “SSQ” (new self-report measure 
developed for use in this study).   
The Social Situations Questionnaire was designed to assess attributions of 
ostracism intent in ambiguous social situations.  The initial version of the scale 
that was presented to all participants consisted of 9 vignettes (and 5 “filler 
vignettes”) and a total of 27 items pertaining to benign (“not ostracism”; 
“SSQn”), punitive (“SSQp”) and oblivious ostracism (“SSQo”) which follows from 
the categories of ostracism identified by Williams (2001).  The final version of 
the scale used in the main analyses was reduced to 7 vignettes and 21 
attribution intent items which are scored on a 5-point Likert scale.  Cronbach’s 
alphas and test-retest reliabilities are reported in the Results section (3.1.1.2 
below).  
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2.6.1. Time Two measures 
The following questionnaires were administered again at Time Two, two weeks 
after initial presentation, in order to establish test-retest reliability since these 
measures were adapted and new respectively: 
• Parental Psychological Control Scale-Youth Self-Report (Barber, 1996) 
(adapted)  
• Social Situations Questionnaire 
 
2.7 Procedure: 
Following ethical approval, the study was advertised in a variety of community 
settings including universities and libraries, by poster and emails.  Potential 
participants were offered the incentive of entry into a £250 prize draw.  They 
were invited to express their interest in participation by emailing the study email 
address, and were then sent the study Information Sheet, and a link to the 
online Consent Form hosted by surveygizmo.com.  After informed consent was 
obtained, participants were emailed a link to the Personal Details form and 
research questionnaires.  Questionnaires were then completed online at a time 
and place of the participants’ own choosing.  Questionnaires were presented in 
random order to each participant.  Completion of all items on each 
questionnaire was compulsory with the result that a complete dataset was 
produced with no missing responses.   Participants in the instrument 
development study were invited by email to complete a further subset of 
questionnaires 2 weeks later.  Personal details were removed from responses 
and replaced with an identity number before scoring.  Following initial data 
exploration, analyses were carried out in accordance with the study hypotheses.  
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2.7.1. Pilot Study Procedure: Part One: Development and pilot of new 
instrument 
Studies of social information processing (SIP) typically use hypothetical 
situation questionnaires, in which vignettes are presented followed by questions 
designed to elicit responses that indicate participants’ processing pattern (Crick 
& Dodge, 1994).  Such studies using hypothetical situations methodology have 
often focused on intent attributions to explore individual differences in social 
processing and to link such differences with outcomes such as social 
adjustment (Crick & Dodge).  The Social Situations Questionnaire developed for 
use in this study was based on this previous research and methodology.  It was 
designed to measure ostracism intent attributions in ambiguous social situations 
using a vignette-style instrument.  Development of the measure involved the 
following steps: 
1  First, the researcher obtained previous self-report measures for intent 
attributions in ambiguous situations (e.g. Bailey & Ostrov, 2008; Nelson, 
Mitchell & Yang, 2008) that have been used for investigating social information 
processing in adults.  Such self-report instruments are versions of Crick’s 
(1995) Children’s Social Behaviour Scale which have been modified for use with 
adults.   In these instruments, brief vignettes are presented with a “situation” or 
“story” title such as “neighbour situation” (Nelson et al) and “lunch story” (Bailey 
& Ostrov).  Each vignette presents an ambiguous social situation which the 
participant is asked to imagine themselves experiencing (for instance “Imagine 
that you are sitting outside your house one morning…two neighbours walk 
by…they say something to each other and laugh”; Nelson et al).  In these 
existing instruments, four alternative intent attribution items are presented for 
each vignette.   Respondents are required to make forced choices with regard 
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to their intent attribution (for example, with reference to the previous example, 
choices include “They were just having fun” or “They were trying to make you 
feel excluded”).   Some evidence for the validity and reliability of these 
measures has been obtained.   
One researcher who has developed an intent attribution instrument (David 
Nelson, personal communication) has found that data in an attributional study 
(Nelson, Mitchell & Yang, 2008) was highly skewed when using forced choice 
responses.  That is, when a forced-choice of vignette items involving different 
types of intent attribution is presented, adult participants largely chose more 
socially desirable items, with only 4-5% choosing hostile intent attributions.  
2.  Vignettes and response items for the Social Situations Questionnaire 
were generated that were based on the existing measures mentioned above.  
Because the Social Situations Questionnaire was designed to measure 
ostracism intent attributions in ambiguous social situations rather than hostile 
intent attributions (which previous instruments were designed to measure), 
considerable modifications needed to be made to the existing vignettes and 
response items and new vignettes needed to be added.  In addition, in order to 
avoid the problem of skewed responses resulting from a forced-choice format, 
adherence to each alternative intent attribution item was indicated on a Likert 
scale.  The impetus for designing the Social Situations Questionnaire was to the 
need to measure punitive attributional intent in ambiguous social situations, but 
items pertaining to oblivious and benign ostracism were also generated. This 
follows from the categories of ostracism identified by Williams (2001).  Items 
measuring adherence to these alternative forms of intent attribution (oblivious 
and “not ostracism”) were included so that the instrument a) has ecological 
validity (that is, adults will normally understand that more than one explanation 
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is possible and this format allows respondents to express this awareness) and 
b) has broader potential usefulness in research and clinical settings.  Nine 
vignettes pertaining to ambiguous ostracism were generated. Three response 
items were presented after each vignette.  For the purpose of the main study, 
the score was the total for the punitive intent attribution items only.  Attributional 
intent item choices reflecting 3 different types of intent attribution (punitive, 
oblivious and “not ostracism”) were produced for each vignette based on face 
validity (e.g. “Your neighbours were criticising you for something” (a punitive 
ostracism item) and “Your neighbours didn’t bother with you because they look 
down on you” (an oblivious ostracism item)).  Five “filler” items were also 
produced to reduce the demand characteristic of the instrument, some of which 
were modified versions of items from the instruments mentioned above.   
3  An expert in the field (Kip Williams, who developed these categories of 
ostracism) confirmed that he agreed with the categorisation of the attribution 
items. 
4  A panel of 11 clinical psychologists independently categorised the 
ostracism items as either punitive ostracism items, oblivious ostracism items or 
non-ostracism items.  
5  The questionnaire was administered to each participant on two 
occasions with approximately a two week interval in accordance with the 
procedure described in 2.7.2 .   
6  Internal consistency of the ostracism attribution scales were calculated 
using Cronbach’s alpha and the correlations between time one and time two 
scores were also calculated to give measures of test-retest reliability.   
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2.7.1.2 Pilot study procedure: Part Two  
In accordance with the procedure described in 2.7.2, the adapted version of the 
Psychological Control Scale was also administered twice, the second 
administration occurring two weeks after initial administration. Test-retest 
reliability was then calculated.    
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3. Results 
3.1. Results of Pilot Study  
3.1.1 Instrument development 
Eleven raters categorised each ostracism item using a forced choice of either 
punitive, oblivious or not ostracism.  Intraclass correlation for raters 
categorisations was 0.99, confidence interval 0.981-0.996, p<.01.  A very high 
level of concordance was therefore demonstrated. 
Inter-item correlations for the three ostracism subscales (Punitive Ostracism, 
Oblivious Ostracism and Not Ostracism) are presented in Appendix 5 (Tables 
17 to 19). Cronbach’s alphas of the nine-vignette version of the social situations 
are presented in Table 1. 
Inspection of the inter-item correlation matrices revealed that the “lunch” 
vignette produced items which negatively correlated with the other items in each 
scale.  The “Hospital” vignette Oblivious Ostracism Scale item had very small 
correlations with other items in that scale.  Table 1 also gives Cronbach’s 
alphas with the “lunch” items and “hospital” items removed. 
 
Table 1: Cronbach’s alpha for 9-vignette version of the Social Situations 
Questionnaire 
 
Scale Cronbach’s alpha 
 9-vignette version 7-vignette version with “lunch” 
and “hospital” items removed 
Punitive Ostracism .822 .882 
Oblivious Ostracism .735 .868 
Not Ostracism .634 .678 
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Given the improved internal consistency indicated by these alpha values, 
subsequent analyses using the Social Situations Questionnaire excluded the 
“lunch” and “hospital” vignette items.  The Not Ostracism Scale could be 
improved by deletion of the cinema item which has low inter-item correlations 
with the rest of the items.  However, the Not Ostracism Scale is not intended to 
be used in analyses; rather it is there to provide ecological validity by providing 
an opportunity for adults to express their awareness that there is more than one 
potential explanation for others’ behaviours in a given situation.   
 
Histograms of the subscales of the Social Situations Questionnaire at Time One 
and Time Two revealed that the distributions were normal for Oblivious Intent 
Attributions and Not Ostracism Attributions, but slightly skewed to the left for 
Punitive Intent Attributions.  Square root transformations of the Time One and 
Time Two Punitive Intent were used in the correlation analyses since the 
transformed variables were not skewed.  Test-retest reliabilities for the 
subscales of the Social Situations Questionnaire are presented in the Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Test-retest reliabilities for the Social Situations Questionnaire 
 
 Time 1-Time2 
Correlations 
(Pearson’s R) 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
N 
Punitive Ostracism 0.802 <0.001 109 
Oblivious Ostracism 0.841 <0.001 109 
Not Ostracism 0.733 <0.001 109 
 
The highly significant correlation between results at the two time points 
suggests the Punitive and Oblivious Ostracism Scales have acceptable stability.  
The Not Ostracism scale has lower stability but test-retest reliability is significant 
at the p<0.001 level. 
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3.1.2. Adapted Parental Psychological Control Scale- Youth self-report (Barber, 
1986) reliability.   
Test-retest reliabilities for the adapted versions of the Psychological Control 
Scale  (Mothers’, Fathers’ and Peers’ psychological control) are presented in 
Table 3. All scales have acceptable reliability. 
Table 3: Test-retest reliability for the Psychological Control Scale 
 Time 1-Time2 
Correlations 
(Pearson’s R) 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
N 
Mother’s Psychological Control 0.903 <0.001 109 
Father’s psychological control 0.889 <0.001 109 
Peers’ psychological control 0.742 <0.001 109 
Total Psychological control 0.901 <0,001 109 
 
3.2. Results of Main Study 
3.2.1 Descriptives and data exploration 
Descriptive data (including mean scores, standard deviations and skewness) for 
all variables included in the study are shown in given in Table 6.  
Table 4: Main Study Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
 Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
OCI-R 330 .00 60.00 18.19 12.82 .969 .134 .324 .268 
OBQ 330 51.00 295.00 157.85 49.50 .249 .134 -.460 .268 
R/T 330 18.00 106.00 58.27 19.50 .184 .134 -.450 .268 
P/C 330 19.00 112.00 65.36 20.30 .015 .134 -.642 .268 
I/CT 330 9.00 84.00 34.15 15.41 .775 .134 .049 .268 
HFS 330 6.00 42.00 21.75 8.31 .304 .134 -.836 .268 
PCSt 330 24.00 111.00 57.85 18.87 .303 .134 -.603 .268 
SSQp 330 7.00 33.00 17.39 5.85 .241 .134 -.554 .268 
KEY: OCI-R= OC Symptoms; OBQ=Full Scale OBQ-44 Score; R/T= Responsibility/Threat beliefs; P/C: 
Perfectionism/ certainty beliefs; HFS: Self-condemnation; PCSt: Total Psychological Control score; SSQp: 
punitive attributions 
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Histograms were plotted for each variable, which revealed many of the 
variables were skewed to the left.  Conversion of the skewness values to z-
scores confirmed that some of the variables were significantly skewed.  Self-
condemnation had significant negative kurtosis (statistic/standard error >1.96 
p<.05.)  Given the skewed nature of the data, square root transformations were 
applied to all variables.  Plots of the transformed variable confirmed that the 
problem of skewed data was improved.  Parametric correlations were then 
produced.   
Table 5: Main Study Parametric Correlations 
 
C.F.=Pearson’s 
Correlation Coefficient 
N=332 OCIr OBQ R/T P/C I/CT HFS PCSt SSQp 
OCI-R C.F. 1 .659** .601** .595** .541** .544** .402** .491** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
OBQ C.F. .659** 1 .898** .905** .835** .699** .466** .573** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
R/T C.F. .601** .898** 1 .726** .667** .605** .421** .529** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
P/C C.F. .595** .905** .726** 1 .679** .629** .402** .460** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 
I/CT C.F. .541** .835** .667** .679** 1 .619** .416** .541** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 
HFS C.F. .544** .699** .605** .629** .619** 1 .466** .521** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 
PCSt C.F. .402** .466** .421** .402** .416** .466** 1 .394** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 
SSQp C.F. .491** .573** .529** .460** .541** .521** .394** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
KEY: OCI-R= OC Symptoms; OBQ=Full Scale OBQ-44 Score; R/T= Responsibility/Threat beliefs; P/C: 
Perfectionism/ certainty beliefs; I/CT: Importance/Control of thoughts; HFS: Self-condemnation; PCSt: 
Total Psychological Control score; SSQp: punitive intent attributions 
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3.2.2 Comparison of study data with those of previous studies. 
3.2.2.1 OCI-R Comparisons 
In this study, the mean Total Score on the OCI-R was 18.19 (S.D.=12.82, range 
0-60).  Hajcak, Huppert, Simons and Foa’s (2004) investigated the 
psychometric properties of the OCI-R in a student sample of n=395 with a 
gender balance similar to that of the current study. Mean Total Score on the 
OCI-R was 18.82 (S.D. 11.10) which is of a very similar magnitude to the 
current study.  Compared to the mean Total Score in a patient sample (n=167) 
of 27.02 (S.D. 13.22) (Abramowitz & Deacon, 2006), the mean score of the 
OCI-R in this study was lower which is in line with expectations for a non-clinical 
sample. 
3.2.2.2 OBQ-44 Comparisons 
In the current study, mean Total Score on the OBQ-44 was 157.85 (S.D. =49.5).  
In the paper that reports the development of the OBQ-44 (OCCWG, 2005) the 
mean Total Score  of the OBQ-44 for the  student control group (n=284)  was 
131.3, (S.D. 44.3).   The Total Score for a community control group (n=86) was 
even lower (mean Total Score= 96, S.D. = 35.1).  For the OCD group in that 
study, mean OBQ Total Score was 174 (S.D.=50.2).   Therefore, in the current 
study, the mean Total Score for the OBQ-44 is closer to the mean Total Score 
of the OCD group score than that of the student and community control groups 
in the OCCWG (2005) study. 
3.2.2.3 Psychological Control Comparisons. 
Much of the research using the unadapted original version of Barber’s (1996) 
Psychological Control Scale-Youth Self-Report uses samples consisting of 
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participants under the age of 18 years.  The majority of studies that use adapted 
versions of the scale with adults ask adults to self-rate their own psychological 
control behaviours rather than to rate the psychological control of others. 
Normative other-rating data for adult samples is therefore not readily available.  
In Soenens et al’s (2007) study,   Mother’s and Father’s Psychological Control 
Scale scores were collapsed together. Scores were entered into analyses as a 
mean score for each participant rather than a total score as in the current study.   
Using this scoring method, the mean Parental Psychological Control score in 
Soenens et al’s study was 2.25 (S.D. = .99) for the 390 student participants 
(79% women and 21% men, mean age 18.7)).  Using the same scoring method, 
the mean for Parental Psychological Control in this study is 2.32 (S.D.=.93), 
which is almost exactly the same as the previous research.  Peer Psychological 
Control is a relatively novel concept and no normative data from previous 
research is available to compare to data in the current study. 
3.2.2.4 Heartland Self-forgiveness Scale comparisons 
The scoring protocol for the Self-forgiveness subscale of the Heartland Self-
forgiveness Scale (HFS) (Thompson et al, 2005) was reversed in this study in 
order to produce a measure of self-condemnation.  In order to make normative 
comparisons with previous research using the scale, raw data was scored in the 
recommended way.  Mean self-forgiveness score for the re-scored HFS data in 
the Main Study sample was 26.27 (S.D. = 8.29).   This compares with a self-
forgiveness mean score for students in Thompson et al’s (2005) study of 30.99 
(n=1111, mean age=19, 52% female, 48% male).   Self-forgiveness in the Main 
Study sample is therefore a little lower than in the previous research.   
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3.2.2.6 Comparison of relationships between variables 
Little previous research has been published that uses the same combination of 
variables used in the current research, which limits the extent to which 
comparisons can be made regarding relationships between variables.  In the 
current research, OC symptoms measured using the OCI-R correlated 
significantly with obsessive beliefs using the OBQ-44 (n=330 r=.659 p<.01).  A 
correlation between these two variables of r=.59, n=761  (Wu, personal 
communication) was found in previous research (Wu & Carter, 2008) which is 
comparable to the current research.  No previous research has been published 
linking psychological control and OCD using the same instruments as the 
current study.  However, one study measured these variables using instruments 
from which the instruments in the current study were derived.  Aycicegi, Harris 
and Dinn (2001) measured OCD symptoms using the Obsessive Compulsive 
Inventory (OCI) (Foa, Kozak, Salkovskis, Coles & Amir, 1998) and parental 
psychological control using the relevant subscale of the Children’s Report of 
Parent Behaviour Inventory (CRPBI-30) (Schludermann & Schludermann, 
1988).  They used a student sample (n=130, 70% females and 30% males, 
mean age 18).  Bivariate regression analysis found OCI scores predicted 
maternal psychological control (R=0.22 F=6.7 (1,128) p<.05) and paternal 
psychological control (R=0.32 F=14.3 (1,128) p<.000).  In the current study, the 
same analyses find that OCI-R scores predicted maternal psychological control 
(R=0.295 F=31.25 df=1,328 p<0.000) and paternal psychological control 
(R=0.259  F=23.62 (1,328) p<.000).  The relationship between these variables 
is therefore comparable.  No additional research using the same or similar 
measures is available to make comparisons with the current research. 
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3.2.3 Regression Analyses for Main Study 
3.2.3.1 Assumption checks 
Regression analyses were performed and outputs were examined to check the 
extent to which the assumptions of multiple regression analysis were met (Field, 
2009, p. 220).    
1 Assumption of no multicollinearity:  Variance proportions were distributed 
across different eigenvalues for each predictor.  The average variance inflation 
factor (VIF) was not substantially above 1 and no VIF was as high as 10 (a 
figure above 10 indicates a problem).  Therefore the assumption of no 
multicollinearity was taken to be met. 
2 Assumption of normally distributed errors:  A histogram and normality plot  of 
the residuals  produced by one of the regression models indicated the residuals 
were positively skewed, therefore the assumption of normality was not met.  
The graph and plot of residuals arising after refitting the regression model with 
square-root transformed variables demonstrated improved normality of the 
residuals distribution.     
3 Assumption of homoscedasticity and assumption of linearity: When 
standardized residuals of the transformed study variables were plotted against 
standardized predicted values for the regression models, examination of the 
resulting scatterplots indicated that for all models at each level of the predictor, 
the variance of the residuals was constant, indicating that the assumption of 
homoscedasticity was met.  There were no obvious curves in the scatter 
patterns apart from when POE is regressed on ICT so the assumption of 
linearity was also taken to be met for the majority of regressions (Field, 2009). 
 85 
 
5 Post hoc casewise diagnostics for the regressions indicated that  5 out of 330 
cases had standardized residuals greater than 3.  However, no Cook’s 
distances were greater than 1 suggesting that the cases were not influential 
data points and were not exerting undue influence on the regression models 
(Field, 2009).  Therefore no cases were excluded.  
3.2.3.2 Obsessive Beliefs and POE variables regressed on OC Symptoms 
 Hierarchical regressions were used.  Since Obsessive Beliefs factors are 
known to all be important in influencing OC Symptoms they were entered in 
Step 1 using the forced entry method.  POE variables were then entered as a 
set, again using the forced entry method.  Results of the regression analysis are 
shown in Tables 6  below. 
Table 6: POE variables regressed on OC Symptoms controlling for Obsessive 
Beliefs. 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta (β) 
1** (Constant) -2.15 .41  -5.23 .00 
R/T .34 .08 .30 4.58 .00 
P/C .32 .08 .27 4.11 .00 
I/CT .19 .07 .16 2.61 .01 
2** (Constant) -3.29 .48  -6.80 .00 
R/T .24 .08 .21 3.24 .00 
P/C .26 .08 .22 3.37 .00 
I/CT .07 .07 .06 .91 .37 
HFS .21 .10 .12 2.09 .04 
PCSt .10 .06 .08 1.76 .08 
SSQp .32 .11 .15 2.86 .00 
a. Dependent Variable: OCI-R 
Note R2 for Step 1=.43, ∆R2 =.04 (p<.001).  **=Model significant at p<.001                                                                                                                                      
KEY: OCI-R= OC Symptoms; OBQ=Full Scale OBQ-44 Score; R/T= Responsibility/Threat beliefs; P/C: 
Perfectionism/ certainty beliefs; I/CT: Importance/Control of thoughts; HFS: Self-condemnation; PCSt: 
Total Psychological Control score; SSQp: punitive intent attributions 
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When Obsessive Belief domains (R/T, P/C and I/CT) are regressed on OC 
Symptoms, each of the belief domain factors significantly predict OC Symptoms 
(R/T and P/C at the p<.001 level and I/CT at the p<.05 level).  This Step 1 
model accounts for 43% of the variance of OC symptoms.  When POE variables 
are added to the model in Step 2, 47% of the variance of OC Symptoms is 
accounted for.   Both models are highly significant (Model 1 F(3,326)=80.72 
P<.001; Model 2 F(6,323)=46.74 p<.001).  In the model that includes POE 
variables, all variables apart from I/CT and PCSt significantly predict OC 
Symptoms, R/T, P/C and SSQp at the p<.01 level and HFS at the p<.05 level.   
3.2.3.3 POE variables regressed on Responsibility/Threat belief domain 
POE variables were regressed on R/T in this model in one set using the forced 
entry method.  Results are shown in Table 7 below. 
Table 7: POE variables regressed on Responsibility/Threat beliefs 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta (β) 
1** (Constant) 1.79 .39  4.56 .00 
HFS .59 .08 .41 7.90 .00 
PCSt .13 .05 .13 2.64 .01 
SSQp .49 .09 .27 5.40 .00 
a. Dependent Variable: R/T 
Note: R2 = .44  **Model significant at the P<001 level 
KEY: OCI-R= OC Symptoms; OBQ=Full Scale OBQ-44 Score; R/T= Responsibility/Threat beliefs; P/C: 
Perfectionism/ certainty beliefs; I/CT: Importance/Control of thoughts; HFS: Self-condemnation; PCSt: 
Total Psychological Control score; SSQp: punitive intent attributions 
 
 
The model accounts for 44% of the variance of Responsibility/Threat beliefs and 
is highly significant (F(3,326) = 85.32 P<.001).  All three POE variables 
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contribute significantly to R/T, HFS contributing the most (β=.41 P<.001), then 
SSQp (β=.27 P<.001) and PCSt is the least influential variable in the model 
(β=.13 p<.05).  
3.2.3.4 POE variables regressed on Perfectionism/Certainty belief domain 
POE variables were regressed on P/C in this model in one set using the forced 
entry method.  Results are shown in Table 8 below. 
Table 8: POE variables regressed on Perfectionism/Certainty beliefs 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta (β) 
1** (Constant) 2.67 .39  6.79 .00 
HFS .72 .08 .50 9.55 .00 
PCSt .11 .05 .11 2.24 .03 
SSQp .29 .09 .16 3.17 .00 
a. Dependent Variable: P/C 
Note: R2 = .43  Model significant at the p<.001 level 
KEY: OCI-R= OC Symptoms; OBQ=Full Scale OBQ-44 Score; R/T= Responsibility/Threat beliefs;  
P/C: Perfectionism/ certainty beliefs; I/CT: Importance/Control of thoughts; HFS: Self-condemnation; PCSt:  
Total Psychological Control score; SSQp: punitive intent attributions 
 
The model accounts for 43% of the variance of Perfectionism/Certainty beliefs 
and is highly significant (F(3,326) = 81.59 P<.001).  All three POE variables 
contribute significantly to P/C, HFS contributing the most (β=.5 P<.001), then 
SSQp (β=.16 P<.001) and PCSt is the least influential variable in the model 
(β=.11 p<.05). 
3.2.3.5 POE variables regressed on Importance/Control of Thoughts belief 
domain 
POE variables were regressed on I/CT in this model in one set using the forced 
entry method.  Results are shown in Table 9 below. 
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Table 9: POE variables regressed on Importance/Control of Thoughts belief 
domain 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .02 .38  .04 .97 
HFS .61 .07 .42 8.35 .00 
PCSt .11 .05 .11 2.32 .02 
SSQp .50 .09 .28 5.69 .00 
a. Dependent Variable: I/CT 
Note: R2 = .46  Model significant at the p<.001 level 
KEY: OCI-R= OC Symptoms; OBQ=Full Scale OBQ-44 Score; R/T= Responsibility/Threat beliefs;  
P/C: Perfectionism/ certainty beliefs; I/CT: Importance/Control of thoughts; HFS: Self-condemnation; PCSt:  
Total Psychological Control score; SSQp: punitive intent attributions 
 
 
The model accounts for 46% of the variance of Importance/Control of Thoughts 
beliefs and is highly significant (F(3,326) = 91.68 P<.001).  All three POE 
variables contribute significantly to I/CT, HFS contributing the most (β=.42 
P<.001), then SSQp (β=.28 P<.001) and PCSt is the least influential variable in 
the model (β=.11 p<.05). 
3.2.4 Post hoc analyses: Effect sizes and Power calculations 
The effect size for each of the four models presented in the results above was 
large.  Post hoc power calculations based on the findings above indicate that 
each of the four models presented in the results achieved 100% power at the 
p<.001 error probability level.   
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4.  Discussion 
 
This study aimed to produce some initial evidence for the potential utility of a 
biopsychosocial theory of OCD; specifically, it aimed to provide evidence that 
affiliative threat (POE) helps to explain the relationship between obsessive 
beliefs and OC symptoms.  The findings of the study will now be considered in 
relation to the study hypotheses, which will be accepted or rejected in the light 
of the study findings.  A critique of the study will then be presented and the 
contribution of study findings to knowledge in the field of OCD will be 
considered.  Possible implications for the treatment of OCD will also be 
discussed and recommendations will be made for future research into the 
relationship between ostracism experiences and OCD.  
 
4.1 Discussion of study findings in relation to hypotheses 
Study findings are considered in the context of the study aims and hypotheses 
below. 
4.1.1 Discussion of Pilot Study findings. 
4.1.1.1 Validity and reliability of a new measure of ostracism intent attributions 
The primary aim of the pilot study was to operationalize the concept of 
ostracism intent attributions for use in the Main Study by developing a valid and 
reliable self-report measure (the Social Situations Questionnaire) since no such 
measure has been published.  The results of the pilot study demonstrated that 
there was a very high level of independent rater agreement on the 
categorisation of ostracism intent items (as either “punitive”, “oblivious” or “not” 
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ostracism) and this is taken as evidence of the instrument’s construct validity.  
The Cronbach’s alphas of the final 7-item version were all acceptable and 
supported the hypothesis that the subscales would be internally consistent. Of 
the three subscales, the “not ostracism” subscale was least internally 
consistent.  Examination of the inter-item correlations revealed that the “not 
ostracism” item for the “Cinema” vignette had low correlations with the other 
“not ostracism” items.  The wording of this item (“Your acquaintance has 
arranged to meet someone else” may be insufficiently differentiated from 
oblivious ostracism, and may therefore be improved by a change of wording (for 
example (“It was too dark for your friend to see you”).  
Acceptable stability of the instrument over time was also demonstrated by the 
significant correlations with large effect sizes between Time One scores and 
Time Two scores (administered approximately 2 weeks later).  The evidence 
therefore supported the hypotheses relating to the validity and reliability of the 
instrument.  Examination of the means of each ostracism variable suggests that 
on average, participants were least likely to attribute punitive intent to 
ambiguous ostracism.  There was a stronger tendency to believe that 
ambiguous ostracism is “oblivious” in nature, and a stronger tendency still to 
reject the notion that ostracism was intentional.  There was no significant skew 
in the distributions of the three scales (i.e. it appears that participants were just 
as likely to score high on each scale as they were to score low)  suggesting that 
the problem of social desirability inherent in the forced choice design was 
resolved by the use of a Likert-scale design.     
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4.1.1.2. Reliability of adapted psychological control scale  
Barber’s Parental Psychological Control Scale-Youth Self-Report (Barber, 1986) 
was adapted for the current study so that it could be used to measure 
retrospective perceived psychological control of peers as well as of parents.  
The adapted instrument showed acceptable stability over time between Time 
One and Time Two as demonstrated by the highly significant correlations and 
large effect sizes between the two time points.  The prediction that maternal, 
paternal and peer psychological control could be reliably measured was 
therefore confirmed. 
4.1.1.3 Conclusions of Pilot Study 
All of the hypotheses for the Pilot study were confirmed by the data.  Some 
evidence for the reliability of the Social Situations Questionnaire was produced, 
and evidence regarding the reliability of the adapted version of the 
Psychological Control Scale-Youth Self-Report was also produced.   
4.1.2 Discussion of Main Study findings 
The study aimed to answer whether POE variables explain some of the well-
established link between obsessive beliefs and OC symptoms.  The findings of 
the Main Study will be discussed for each POE variable in relation to the study 
hypotheses and in relation to previous research.  Theoretical implications will be 
explored and conclusions will then be summarised.   
4.1.2.1 Self-condemnation  
Self condemnation significantly predicted OC Symptoms controlling for 
obsessive beliefs factors and the other two POE variables.  It also significantly 
predicted each of the factors of the OBQ-44 whilst controlling for total 
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psychological control score and punitive ostracism attributions.  Of the three 
POE variables, it showed the strongest relationship with Responsibility/Threat 
beliefs (R/T), Perfectionism/Certainty beliefs (P/C) and Importance/Control of 
Thoughts beliefs (I/CT).  Partial correlations of self-condemnation with the three 
OBQ-44 factors in this model indicate that it contributes 39%, 40% and 38%  of 
the variance to R/T beliefs, P/C beliefs and I/CT beliefs respectively, and  16%, 
16% and 18% to  R/T beliefs, P/C beliefs and I/CT beliefs respectively when the 
other two POE variables are controlled for (See Appendix 7).  The study 
hypothesis regarding self-condemnation was therefore supported.  Since self-
condemnation contributes strongly to the variance of the three factors of the 
OBQ-44 it appears to be conceptually close to the various domains of that 
measure.     
Conceptualising cognition as dialogic emphasises self-to-self relating and also 
fosters consideration of tone, intent and “authority” of the internal “voice” 
(cognition) along with its content.  According to the theoretical stance of this 
study, low self-forgiveness is taken to indicate an inner “relationship” consisting 
of an authority-infused “part” which relates to a relatively less powerful part, 
which experiences coldness and condemnation in relation to breaches or 
anticipated breaches of moral rules.  This self-to-self relating is viewed as key to 
a model of cognition in which an anticipated internal gist-like “voice” has the 
capacity to trigger the threat-defence system.   
As previously discussed in 1.3.10, the dialogical view of OC cognition 
developed in this thesis reconceptualises obsessive beliefs as intrinsically 
involving the notion of self-condemnation.  For instance, a responsibility schema 
defined declaratively as “I have pivotal responsibility for preventing harm” can 
be dialogically  reconceptualised as an anticipated, condemnatory, authoritarian 
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voice (“I will blame you and never forgive you if you break moral rules and I will 
ignore your distress at being so condemned”) directed at a less dominant voice  
(“I must account for breaches of moral rules and I will be blamed and never 
forgiven for such breaches”); the overestimation of threat belief is 
reconceptualised as a bodily sensation of threat triggered by the anticipated 
condemnation of the internal voice (and thenceforth a sense that if one is 
feeling anxious, there must be something dangerous causing the threat  (c.f. 
Arntz, Rauner & van den Hout, 1995) and a “better safe than sorry” algorithm 
(c.f. Gilbert, 2001, p.18 - see also 1.2.3.9.4.1 above); perfectionism and 
certainty beliefs are reconceptualised as reflecting defences against the 
anticipatory fear of self- (and other-) condemnation; control of thoughts reflects 
a further internal defence against a condemnatory inner “voice” that defines 
both inner processes and external behaviours as moral issues and threatens 
punishment for both; and beliefs relating to the over-importance of thoughts are 
reconceptualised as relating to the automatic triggering of the threat-defence 
system by anticipated condemnation of internal events (thoughts and feelings) 
by the authoritarian “voice”, and thereby attributional processes that attempt to 
“make sense” of this internal state of threat (c.f. Arntz et al).  Such a dialogical 
reconceptualisation of cognition therefore may potentially offer a parsimonious 
explanation for the association of belief domains with each other.     
The concept of an internal “voice” that monitors, judges and condemns internal 
processes has similarities with Wells’ (1997) metacognitive theory of OCD.  The 
central prediction of the metacognitive model is that the significance and danger 
of intrusions is most relevant to understanding the disorder and that negative 
appraisal of thoughts results in distress (Fisher, 2009).  Metacognition is 
hypothesised by Wells to involve declarative beliefs about thinking (such as the 
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belief that thoughts can be controlled); feelings about thinking (such as a sense 
of confidence about thoughts), and strategies for monitoring and controlling 
cognition such as thought suppression and distraction.  Attention to potential 
internal threats is maintained by maladaptive beliefs such as “paying attention 
to signs of threat keeps me safe” (Fisher).   Obsessive belief domains are 
viewed by Wells as epiphenomena of metacognitive beliefs.  Some evidence 
supportive of the metacognitive model has been produced such as the finding 
that changes in metacognitive beliefs predicted changes in OCD symptom 
levels (Solem, Haland, Vogel, Hansen, & Wells, 2009); and the finding that 
metacognitive beliefs about intrusions predicted OC symptoms over and above 
the belief domains indexed by the OBQ (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004). The 
dialogic reconceptualisation of such “metacognition” as an anticipated 
authoritative “voice” (that monitors, judges and condemns internal processes 
(thoughts and feelings) in the same way that a psychologically controlling parent 
may control and punish external expressions (verbal, emotional and/or 
behavioural) using punitive ostracism) may help to explain the OCD sufferer’s 
high stake in controlling inner processes, the difficulty in dismissing the 
authoritative “voice” and bodily sensations of threat and discomfort resulting 
from the pseudo-social threat that the internal “voice” represents. 
Mancini and Gangemi (2004) reference a concept similar to this study’s concept 
of self-condemnation in their concept of “fear of guilt”, the guilt being seen as 
the emotion that may ensue from behaving irresponsibly.  They argue that 
Salkovskis’s definition of responsibility (‘‘the belief that one has power which is 
pivotal to bring about or prevent subjectively crucial negative outcomes. These 
outcomes are perceived as essential to prevent. They may be actual, that is 
having consequences in the real world, and/ or at a moral level’’: Salkovskis & 
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Forrester, 2002 p.48) is neither necessary nor adequate for defining a mental 
state that regulates OC behaviour and that is sufficient for an individual to “feel 
responsible”.  They propose that, in fact, OCD sufferers are actually afraid that 
their behaviour will not match up to their sense of duty rather than that a 
negative event may occur.  This notion appears to implicitly make some 
suggestion regarding internal criticism/condemnation but is not explicitly 
explored by those researchers, nor is there any exploration of how such internal 
criticism/condemnation may be processed at a biological level, nor of a dialogic 
(self-to-self) inner relationship.    
Self-condemnation/self-forgiveness was measured in the current study in an 
attempt to operationalize the hypothesised existence and activation of an 
internal condemnatory voice.  The condemnatory “voice” is also conceptualised 
as being “cold” in tone, distant from the condemned part within the individual’s 
“internal space” (c.f. Hermans, 2001) and low in empathy/ sympathy and hence 
is capable of triggering a biological threat-defence response, but this study did 
not operationalize or explore these aspects.  Rating declarative statements 
regarding one’s view of one’s relationship with oneself may not be the optimal 
method for operationalising this variable.  Previous research into dialogical 
models of psychopathology has tended to use process research and discourse 
analysis to assess an individual’s “internal multiplicity” (e.g. Osatuke, Gray, 
Glick, Stiles & Barkham’s (2004) assimilation model).  Given that the results 
offered some support for the hypothesis that self-condemnation plays a role in 
OCD, further research into these aspects of self-condemnation in relation to 
OCD is warranted. 
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4.1.2.2 Punitive ostracism intent attributions 
Punitive ostracism intent attributions significantly predicted OC Symptoms 
controlling for obsessive beliefs factors and the other two POE variables.  It also 
significantly predicted each of the factors of the OBQ-44 whilst controlling for 
self-condemnation and total psychological control score.  Of the three POE 
variables, it had the strongest relationship with OC Symptoms after controlling 
for OBQ-44 factors and the other two POE variables.  Partial correlations of 
self-condemnation with the three OBQ-44 factors in this model indicate that it 
contributes 28%, 21% and 29% of the variance to R/T beliefs, P/C beliefs and 
I/CT beliefs respectively, and 8%, 3% and 9% to R/T beliefs, P/C beliefs and 
I/CT beliefs respectively when the other two POE variables are controlled for 
(See Appendix 7).  The study hypothesis regarding punitive ostracism intent 
attributions was therefore supported.   
This study conceptualises punitive ostracism intent attributions as being linked 
with the hyperactivation of a “social monitoring system” (Pickett & Gardner, 
2005). Alternatively, they may be conceptualised as a bias in social information 
processing (SIP) (e.g. Crick & Dodge, 1994) which results from experiences of 
punitive rejection.  The internalisation of social experiences has been described 
in different literatures as object relations, IWMs, schemas, internal dialogues 
and so on.  The types of social threat experiences which may lead to the 
development of such biases in SIP are viewed as being processed at a 
fundamental level in a similar manner to physical threats.  Such biases may be 
linked with the tendency of the evolved brain to function on a “better safe than 
sorry” algorithm (Gilbert, 2001) when threatened, whether the threat is physical 
or social.   
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It is possible that SIP threat-based bias may trigger threat-defence responses 
within the appropriate “social mentality” (Gilbert, 1989, 1992, 2000) with its 
associated attentional, emotional, motivational and behavioural components.  
That is, if the context of the individual’s SIP biases cause the individual to 
experience ostracism as punitive, his or her attention, emotions, motivation and 
behaviours will be directed at issues of affiliation as opposed, for instance, to 
issues of status, esteem and competition which are viewed as relating to the 
“ranking mentality” (and which, therefore, may have some link with the 
experience of oblivious ostracism, although this was not explored in this study).    
A key issue with regard to the impact of POE on OC Symptoms is the notion 
that OCD sufferers may have had experiences of ostracism that is manipulative 
and non-contingent.  Such manipulation (i.e. psychological control) effectively 
positions the target as a perpetrator and hence responsible for (moral) harm but 
the nature of the moral breach and the nature of the punishment are likely to 
both be experienced as ambiguous.   Hypervigilance to cues of punitive 
ostracism and a tendency to over-attribute ambiguous social signals to 
punishment (“better safe than sorry”)  may then motivate perfectionist strategies 
and compulsions in an attempt to pre-empt further blame and also reparative 
social behaviours (such as confessing and reassurance-seeking).    
4.1.2.3 Recalled psychological control. 
Total score psychological control did not significantly predict OC Symptoms 
when obsessive beliefs factors and the other two POE variables were controlled 
for.  It did significantly predict each of the factors of the OBQ-44 whilst 
controlling for self-condemnation and punitive ostracism intent attributions, but it 
had the least influence on these models.   Partial correlations of total 
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psychological control with the three OBQ-44 factors in this model indicate that it 
contributes 18%, 16% and 17%  of the variance to R/T beliefs, P/C beliefs and 
I/CT beliefs respectively, and  2%, 2.% and 2% to  R/T beliefs, P/C beliefs and 
I/CT beliefs respectively when the other two POE variables are controlled for 
(See Appendix 7).  The study hypotheses regarding psychological control were 
therefore only partially supported.   
Clearly, recalled psychological control cannot be taken as a valid reflection of 
lived experiences without further research which is longitudinal in nature.  
Further research clarifying the extent to which perceptions of psychological 
control are validated e.g. by observer reports is therefore required.  It is possible 
that the non-significance of the link between psychological control and OC 
symptoms controlling for the other POE variables and obsessive beliefs 
indicates that OCD sufferers are not significantly more likely than non-sufferers 
to have experienced controlling punitive ostracism by parents and peers.  
However, it is also possible that a Type Two error was made in the study, 
resulting from sampling error  or from difficulties in operationalizing the concept 
of remembered punitive ostracism. For instance, the Psychological Control 
Scale (Barber, 1986) includes items pertaining to verbal control as well as 
punitive ostracism.   Memories of past experiences appear to have less direct 
impact on OC symptoms than certain cognitive styles (that may, nevertheless, 
have been initially caused, at least in part, by social threat experiences).  
Individuals may have suffered psychological control in the past, but given its 
sometimes subtle nature it may not been laid down in memory as strongly and 
clearly as more obvious forms of threat and trauma.  It is also in the nature of 
memories that they are liable to fade and become less accurate over time.   
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Whilst it was hypothesised that memories of psychological control may 
contribute to the maintenance as well as the development of self-condemnation 
and punitive ostracism intent attributions, it may be that the latter two variables 
have a stronger role in maintenance of the OCD once they are established than 
do memories of prior experiences.  Punitive ostracism attributions and self-
condemnation may cause the individual to continue to lay down memories of 
punitive ostracism, but this phenomenon was not captured in the Psychological 
Control Scale given to the participants which focused only on childhood 
memories.   Nevertheless, memories of psychological control do significantly 
contribute variance to both OC symptoms and obsessive beliefs when the other 
study variables are not controlled for (see Appendix 8).  Of the three subscales 
(maternal, paternal and peer psychological control), peer psychological control 
made the strongest contribution to OC symptoms controlling for the other 
psychological control scales.  Experiences with peers have not been focused on 
in previous OCD research, so this result suggests that further investigation of 
possible links between peer experiences (e.g. bullying in the form of “indirect 
aggression”) may be warranted.   
4.1.2.4 Discussion of the POE concept in relation to study findings and previous 
research 
As previously described, POE is a construct developed for the purpose of this 
study.   It is composed of variables that are construed as relating to the 
experience of punitive ostracism, whether that be recalled experiences, or the 
inner experience of unforgiving “self-to-self” relating, or a social information 
processing bias reflecting hypervigilance to a fundamental social threat (punitive 
ostracism).  The study aimed to answer whether variables defined under the 
rubric “POE” helps to explain some of the variance of the established link 
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between obsessive beliefs and OC symptoms.  Results of the study are 
generally supportive of this hypothesis, although the impact of memories of 
psychological control did not significantly contribute to the variance of OC 
symptoms once the other study variables are controlled for.  The 
Importance/Control of Thoughts factor no longer significantly predicts OC 
Symptoms once POE variables are added to the model, demonstrating that 
POE confounds the relationship between this belief domain and OC symptoms.   
POE has not been previously researched in the field of OCD, but certain 
concepts that have been researched in relation to OCD may have some 
conceptual overlap.  As mentioned in 1.3.9, Pace et al (2011) have drawn 
together fragmented research findings relating to the relationship of criticism to 
OCD in a review of the literature pertaining to the cognitive appraisal model.  
They report research that has demonstrated the existence of a significant 
relationship between OCD and perceived criticism/hostility (e.g. Van Noppen & 
Steketee, 2009) and report that criticism has been related mainly to the belief 
domains of perfectionism and responsibility.  Whilst it is possible that there is 
some overlap between the notion of criticism and the POE construct, in this 
study, all POE variables contribute significantly to effect of all three factors of 
the OBQ-44 on OC symptoms rather than  a subset of belief domains.  
Challcombe and Salkovskis’s (2009) suggestion that criticism can be assessed 
by, for instance, counting critical comments, also differentiates criticism from 
elements of POE.  That is, the conceptualisation of criticism as overt and 
explicit overlooks the inferential, contextualised and implicit nature of much 
human communication; “cold-shouldering”, “sending to Coventry” and giving 
someone the “silent treatment” are all effective ways of criticising literally 
without saying a word.  The concept of psychological control allows for these 
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more subtle and manipulative ways of criticising others, controlling them (e.g. 
eliciting guilt and reparative action by means of “sham moral aggression”; 
Trivers, 1971) and punishing them using ostracism.  It also allows for the 
possibility that the non-contingent and unfathomable negative reinforcement 
schedule suggested by the psychological construct may produce superstitious 
behaviours in the form of internal and external rituals (c.f. Aycicegi et al 2002,  
1.2.3.9.5 above).  
Pace et al (2011) also report that the link that researchers generally make 
between criticism and perfectionism/responsibility is a desire for approval (e.g. 
Frost, Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990) and avoidance of accountability and 
blame (e.g. Rachman, 1976).  Here, an orientation to potential social threat 
(punitive ostracism/condemnation) is implicitly referred to within the concepts of 
“desire for approval” and “avoidance of blame/accountability”.  That is, both of 
these could be seen as defensive “safety strategies” designed to avoid 
rejection/ostracism/potential punishment or condemnation.  Bhar & Kyrios’s 
(1999) finding that “sociotropy” was predictive (along with socially-prescribed 
perfectionism) of OC symptoms after controlling for gender and depression 
further illustrates the apparent heightened orientation towards acceptance and 
vigilance to the threat of ostracism in people who suffer from OCD.      
4.1.2.5 Study findings conclusions 
The central premise of the study that variables defined as “punitive ostracism 
experiences” add to our understanding of the link between obsessive beliefs 
and OC symptoms was supported.  Overall, the evidence supported the 
hypotheses, although memories of psychological control did not contribute 
significantly to the variance of OC symptoms after the other study variables 
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were controlled for. A new instrument has been developed for the purpose of 
the study that has demonstrated acceptable psychometric properties, and its 
punitive ostracism intent scale performed in the manner predicted in relation to 
obsessive beliefs and OC symptoms.  The discriminative validity of the three 
different scales of the new instrument was not investigated in this study.   
Further research and development of the scale will be needed to further validate 
it and test its utility as a psychometric instrument.   
4.2 Methodological Issues 
4.2.1 Strengths of the study 
The study has a number of strengths.  Its main strengths lie in its innovation as 
described below. 
Firstly, it offers a novel theoretical approach to understanding how extant 
findings in the social, biological and psychological domains may be linked, as 
well as offering a theoretical basis for understanding why these links occur in 
terms of evolutionary theory.  Cognition, traditionally viewed as schematic and 
referential is reconceptualised as brain-based and multi-voiced by drawing on 
neuroscientific models and psycholinguistic understandings.  Psycholinguistic 
perspectives on cognition offer understandings which draw together the 
referential aspects of language and its social/ “performative” aspects (that is, 
the notions that the social act lies at the heart of language and “meaning”), and 
which assert that conscious thought is essentially internalised “multi-voiced” 
speech that is necessarily affective and motivated and linked to biological 
requirements.  This then provides a basis on which to understand the automatic 
triggering of conscious or tacit anxiety, pain or other threat-defence responding 
on a physiological level to internal dialogue, which in turn is learned and 
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absorbed from the voices and behaviours of others in the social milieu.  Control 
of others by means of manipulative relationship/love withdrawal is another key 
aspect of the theory, since it may lead to biases in social information processing 
reflected in the anticipated ostracising, cold responses of both the external other 
and the internal “answering voice”.  In summary, this novel approach answers 
Taylor et al’s (2007) call for a “comprehensive model of OCD” that integrates 
“mind and brain” (p. 24) and it provides a “fresh perspective” on OCD as called 
for by Whittal et al 2008, p.1003).    
Secondly, a new measure has been constructed that operationalizes the 
concept of ambiguous ostracism intent attributions and some evidence of its 
internal consistency, validity and stability over time has been demonstrated.  
The measure has proved to have some relevance to OCD and has potential to 
be used in further research, either into OCD or other forms of psychopathology 
or more generally into ostracism and its impacts.  The new measure also 
contributes to the novel construct of “punitive ostracism experiences”.   The new 
measure also involved innovation of design in relation to vignette style 
attribution-intent measures since it used a Likert-scale rather than the forced-
choice design that extant measures use.  .   
Thirdly, the study has used a relatively novel means of administering the 
measures to participants online.  This has enabled the research to access a 
larger number of participants at a much lower cost than would have been 
possible using paper-and-pencil administration.  Coles, Cook and Blake (2007) 
compared paper and pencil administration of the OBQ-44 and the OCI to 
administration over the internet in a non-selected student sample.  Results of 
the study supported the equivalence of the measures regardless of 
administration method.  Use of internet administration allows for compulsory 
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completion of all questions before the participant can move on to the next page, 
so there was no missing data.  In addition, it allows for automatic randomisation 
of the order of presentation of the questionnaires, avoiding order effects. 
Fourth, it examined the concept of psychological control in relation to OCD, and 
although this is not entirely novel, it formed part of a new conceptual 
understanding of OCD and its development.  In addition, the study introduced 
the possibility that sufferers’ experiences with their peers during their 
development may have a role in the development of the condition, and adapted 
an existing measure for investigating this hypothesis.  Some initial evidence 
supporting the contribution of memories of psychological control and obsessive 
beliefs was produced, although the link between these memories and OC 
symptoms was not significant in this sample after other POE variables and 
obsessive beliefs were controlled for.  
Fifth, the study and its findings have clear clinical relevance, which opens up 
new avenues of development and research into treatment for OCD.  This is 
further discussed in section 4.3 below.   
4.2.2 Study Weaknesses and suggestions for future research 
The study has a number of limitations, as a result of which conclusions and 
interpretations must be treated with some caution. 
One limitation of the study is the nature of the sample.  The study used a non-
selected community sample, and recruited anyone aged 18 or over who 
responded to the study advertisement, which described itself as a study into 
mental health.  The advertisement was disseminated in electronic form as well 
as posters and flyers.  It was advertised widely within several institutes of higher 
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education but also as an advertisement in a community free newspaper, as 
fliers in public libraries and so on.  Spontaneous comments made by a number 
of individuals who responded by email to the advertisement indicated that they 
had a history of mental health problems and that the advertisement had been 
disseminated to and by mental health support/action groups.  Whilst there is no 
obvious reason to believe that this introduced anything other than random error 
into the study, there is some possibility that the sample was affected by some 
unknown systematic error, for instance relating to mental health diagnosis or 
status. This could therefore lead to type l errors. Certainly, mean obsessive 
beliefs score in this sample was notably higher than in some previously-
reported research using non-patient samples.  Limited demographic information 
was collected, and there were no questions regarding participants’ mental 
health history, so it was not possible to clarify this issue.  
Furthermore, whilst the use of non-clinical samples in OCD research is common 
and in theory justified on the basis that OCD experiences occur on a continuum 
(Gibbs, 1996) in the general population, further research using clinical samples 
containing individuals who have been diagnosed with OCD will be necessary 
before conclusions can confidently be made.  The findings of this study may 
potentially be specific to the particular measures used, and so replication using 
different measures of (e.g. of depression and OC symptoms) would potentially 
strengthen conclusions regarding the findings.   
A further methodological limitation relates to the cross-sectional and 
retrospective nature of the study.  Evidence of links between variables in this 
study can not be taken as evidence of causality.  For instance, evidence that 
memories of psychological control experiences within childhood impacted on 
the association between obsessive beliefs and OC symptoms can not be taken 
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as evidence that psychological control by peers and/or parents cause either 
obsessive beliefs or OC symptoms.  A longitudinal design (including 
independent ratings of psychologically controlling behaviours by peers and 
parents) would be required to clarify the nature of OCD sufferers’ social 
experience during their development and its resulting impact upon their thinking, 
responding and psychopathology in adult life.   
In this study, the aim was to demonstrate associations between POE and the 
independent and dependent variables (OC symptoms and obsessive beliefs) 
rather than to prove any causal links.  One reason for an association between a 
POE variable (self-condemnation) and obsessive belief domains has been 
argued to be conceptual.   For instance, rather than self-condemnation causing 
responsibility beliefs, the suggestion is that the former variable offers  a 
reconceptualisation of such beliefs in terms that are more affective, intrinsically 
social and less static than the traditional conceptualisation of responsibility 
beliefs.  In fact in this study all three POE variables (memories that involve 
punitive ostracism; inner dialogue that evokes an experience that is similar to 
that of punitive ostracism; and perceptions of the social environment that cause 
a bias to interpretations of punitive ostracism in ambiguous situations) are  
hypothesised to be intrinsic to attitudes towards, salience of and responses to 
internal and external moral/accountability-related issues (including, for OCD 
sufferers, internal issues).  However, it is also possible that POE variables  do 
have a causative link with some or all of the obsessive belief domains (and vice 
versa).  Issues of causality may be more appropriately investigated in 
longitudinal research and in research that uses more complex analyses such as 
structural equation modelling.  Further evidence for the theoretical stance may 
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be the degree to which it explains and predicts relationships between variables 
and outcomes to interventions that are based on the theory.   
The study did not control for other conditions such as depression and 
generalised anxiety and this again limits what can be concluded.  The 
theoretical stance of the study suggests that the impact of POE is specific to 
OCD, but the lack of inclusion of anxiety and depression measures means that  
this conclusion can not yet be drawn.  Comorbidity with depression often occurs 
in OCD (37% of cases in Torres et al’s 2006 British study), and it is possible 
that depression could in turn confound the link between POE and obsessive 
beliefs.  However, depression may also be a consequence of OCD.  Again, the 
implication is that more complex models and analyses are required to better 
understand the complex relationships between OCD-related variables.    
In addition, OCD is a heterogenous condition, with highly idiosyncratic 
symptoms-sets amongst individual sufferers (McKay et al., 2004), and there is 
some evidence that there may be some differences between aetiologies and 
maintenance factors amongst different symptoms subsets.  This study did not 
analyse the data on the basis of symptoms subsets, so at this stage, no 
confident assertion can be made regarding the applicability of the conclusions 
across all symptoms subsets. Indeed, the    OCI-R used in this study to assess 
OC symptoms is weighted more towards measuring compulsions than 
obsessions (Foa et al., 2002), therefore the results in this study may be specific 
to these types of symptoms. Further research using different measures of OCD 
and including symptoms subtypes in the analysis will be needed to clarify these 
issues.   
 108 
 
The SSQ was developed for use as a measure of bias in social information 
processing towards interpretation of ambiguous ostracism as punitive in nature.  
Whilst some evidence of its validity and reliability has been presented, it will 
need further validation to strengthen the study findings.  At this stage its factor 
structure is unclear, and there is a possibility, for instance, that punitive 
ostracism and oblivious ostracism are part of the same factor structure using 
this measure,  so again results must be interpreted with caution. 
Finally, the thrust of this study has been to present an argument for a 
biopsychosocial model of OCD.  However, this research did not include any 
evidence from the biological domain, and research that involves biological 
variables will be needed in order to further assess the validity and usefulness of 
this model.  For example, in a neuroimaging study, Masten et al (2011) found 
that level of activation in the ACC  whilst 13 years olds were ostensibly 
“excluded” by peers during an online task, was associated with parent-reported 
depressive symptoms a year later.  A similar paradigm could be used to 
potentially make links with OC symptoms.  Williams and Jarvis (2006) created a 
“cyberball” virtual ball-toss game to simulate ostracism for use during functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and recently Goodacre and Zadro (2010) 
simulated ostracism for use in fMRI research using an ostensible real-time 
webcam conversation which actually involved pre-recorded clips of 
confederates which could then be manipulated to give the participant the 
impression that he or she was being ostracised.   Such techniques could 
potentially be adapted for use in OCD research; for example, independent 
groups of participants could be “primed” using tasks that manipulate 
responsibility before they experience “virtual” ostracism (as described above); 
the criterion measure in this example could be degree of activation of OCD-
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relevant parts of the brain.  Another avenue of investigation may be to study 
whether drugs that have been shown to have some impact on the experience of 
“social pain” may also impact on OC symptoms or on “just not right” feelings.  
For example, Dewal, MacDonald, Webster, Masten and Baumeister (2010) 
found that the analgesic acetaminophen (which exerts its effect on pain through 
the central rather than the peripheral nervous system) reduced the experience 
of social pain in participants.  If use of such a drug could be shown to reduce 
OC symptoms and/or “just not right” experiences in OCD sufferers, then this 
would provide further evidence of the validity of the biopsychosocial model. 
4.3 Clinical implications of study findings 
The findings and the study’s theoretical underpinnings have some clinical 
implications with regard to directions for development of treatments for OCD.  
As previously discussed, pharmacological, cognitive and behavioural treatments 
for OCD, whilst effective to some degree, nevertheless have problems with non-
compliance, relapse, and a proportion of sufferers do not benefit these 
treatments.  This study’s biopsychosocial model of OCD describes a “multi-
voiced self” whose internal dialogue can trigger the threat-defence system and 
hence influence attention, affect, motivation and physiology.  The 
reconceptualisation offered by the biopsychosocial model, together with the 
finding that self-condemnation plays a mediational role in the impact of 
obsessional belief domains on OC symptoms, point to the possibility that an 
approach to OCD treatment that targets the individual’s self-to-self relating may 
be fruitful.  Recent developments in cognitive therapy include the development 
of “compassion focused therapy” which includes techniques described as 
“compassionate mind training” (e.g. Gilbert, 2010).  Some evidence for the 
effectiveness of this approach in reducing shame, self-criticism, depression and 
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anxiety in clinical groups has been presented (e.g. Gilbert & Proctor, 2006).  
This approach to therapy itself draws on evolutionary psychology and on brain-
based understandings of cognition and conceptualises the impact of some of 
the training methods as a kind of “neuro-physio-therapy” for the brain (Gilbert, 
2005, p. 295).   This approach has, to date, not been evaluated in relation to 
OCD or to self-condemnation/self-forgiveness, but this study does provide 
evidence that investment in such development and evaluation in future would 
be warranted.    Similarly, dialogical approaches to therapy (e.g. that work with 
an individual’s internal “voices” by increasing recognition of them and 
rebalancing the power and authority of different internal voices) may have 
something to contribute to the treatment of OCD (e.g. Whelton and Greenberg, 
2004).   It seems possible that an initial treatment focus on increasing self-
forgiveness and self-empathy, and on reducing the power and authority of the 
condemning internal “voice” may decrease the aversiveness of 
exposure/response prevention and increase willingness to undertake 
behavioural experiments, and hence may improve the high attrition rates 
associated with traditional behavioural and cognitive approaches in OCD.  This 
would potentially provide further empirical evidence for the validity of the model, 
and may also improve our ability to alleviate the suffering caused by this often 
debilitating condition.   
4.4 Conclusions  
Having offered an argument for a biopsychosocial conceptualisation of OCD, 
the study attempted to operationalize some of the concepts involved in this 
theoretical stance in order to provide some initial evidence for the validity of the 
theory over and above the presentation of the argument.  The findings largely 
support the study hypotheses.  However, the study also has a number of 
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limitations that require that findings are interpreted with caution.  Nevertheless, 
the aim was to produce sufficient evidence to warrant further research and 
testing of the biopsychosocial model, and it is asserted that this over-riding goal 
has been achieved.  
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6. Appendices  
Appendix 1: Measures (all measures were  posted on a surveygizmo.com 
webpage) 
1. Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised 
 
The following statements refer to experiences that many people have in their everyday 
lives.  Circle the number that best describes HOW MUCH that experience has 
DISTRESSED or BOTHERED you during the PAST MONTH.  The numbers refer to the 
following verbal labels. 
         Not at  all           A little             Moderately          A   lot           Extremely 
          O                         1                      2                         3                    4                                                                                                                     
1. I have saved up so many things that they get in the way. 0   1   2   3   4  
2. I check things more often than necessary. 
 
0   1   2   3   4  
3. I get upset if objects are not arranged properly. 
 
0   1   2   3   4  
4. I feel compelled to count while I am doing things. 
 
0   1   2   3   4  
5. I find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has 
been touched be strangers or certain people. 
 
0   1   2   3   4  
6.  I find it difficult to control my own thoughts. 
 
0   1   2   3   4  
7.  I collect things I don’t need. 
 
0   1   2   3   4  
8.  I repeatedly check doors, windows, drawers etc. 
 
0   1   2   3   4  
9. I get upset if others change the way I have arranged 
things. 
 
0   1   2   3   4  
10.  I feel I have to repeat certain numbers. 
 
0   1   2   3   4  
11.  I sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply 
because I feel contaminated. 
 
0   1   2   3   4  
12. I am upset by unpleasant thoughts that come into my 
mind against my will. 
 
0   1   2   3   4  
13. I avoid throwing things away because I am afraid I might 
need them later. 
 
0   1   2   3   4  
14. I repeatedly check gas and water taps and light switches 
after turning them off. 
 
0   1   2   3   4  
15. I need things to be arranged in a particular order. 
 
0   1   2   3   4  
16. I feel that there are good and bad numbers. 
 
0   1   2   3   4  
17. I wash my hands more often and longer than necessary 
 
0   1   2   3   4  
18. I frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in 
getting rid of them. 
0   1   2   3   4  
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2. Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-44 
 
This inventory lists different attitudes and beliefs that people sometimes hold.  Read 
each statement carefully and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.  For each 
of the statements, choose the number matching the answer that best describes how 
you think.  Because people are different, there are no right or wrong answers.   
 
To decide whether a given statement is typical or your way of looking at things, simply 
keep in mind what you are like most of the time.   
 
 
Use the following scale: 
1                       2                       3                       4                      5                       6                       7 
Disagree            Disagree                   Disagree         Neither Agree            Agree                     Agree                    Agree 
 very                moderately                  a little                  nor                        a little                 moderately                 very 
 much                                                                            disagree                                                                              much 
 
1 I often think things around me are unsafe. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 If I’m not absolutely sure of something, I’m bound to make a 
mistake. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 Things should be perfect according to my own standards. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 In order to be a worthwhile person, I must be perfect at 
everything I do. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 When I see any opportunity to do so, I must act to prevent bad 
things from happening. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 Even If harm is very unlikely, I should try to prevent it at any cost. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 For me, having bad urges is as bad as actually carrying them out. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 If I don’t act when I foresee danger, then I am to blame for any 
consequences. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 If I can’t do something perfectly, I shouldn’t do it at all. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 I must work to my full potential at all times. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 It is essential for me to consider all possible outcomes of a 
situation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 Even minor mistakes mean a job is not complete. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 If I have aggressive thoughts or impulses about my loved ones, 
this means I may secretly want to hurt them. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14 I must be certain of my decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 In all kinds of daily situations, failing to prevent harm is just as 
bad as deliberately causing harm.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16 Avoiding serious problems (for example, illness or accidents) 
requires constant effort on my part. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17 For me, not preventing harm is as bad as causing harm. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18 I should be upset if I make a mistake. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19 I should make sure others are protected from any negative 
consequences of my decisions or actions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20 For me, things are not right if they are not perfect. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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21 Having nasty thoughts means I am a terrible person. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22 If I do not take extra precautions, I am more likely than others to 
have or cause a serious disaster. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23 In order to feel safe, I have to be as prepared as possible for 
anything that could go wrong. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24 I should not have bizarre or disgusting thoughts. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25 For me, making a mistake is as bad as failing completely. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26 It is essential for everything to be clear cut, even in minor 
matters. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27 Having a blasphemous thought is as sinful as committing a 
sacrilegious act. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28 I should be able to rid my mind of unwanted thoughts. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29 I am more likely than other people to accidentally cause harm to 
myself or to others. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30 Having bad thoughts means I am weird or abnormal. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
31 I must be the best at things that are important to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
32 Having an unwanted sexual thought or image means I really want 
to do it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
33 If my actions could have even a small effect on a potential 
misfortune, I am responsible for the outcome. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
34 Even when I am careful, I often think that bad things will happen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
35 Having intrusive thoughts means I’m out of control. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
36 Harmful events will happen unless I am very careful. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
37 I must keep working at something until it’s done exactly right. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
38 Having violent thoughts means I will lose control and become 
violent. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
39 To me, failing to prevent a disaster is as bad as causing it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
40 If I don’t do a job perfectly, people won’t respect me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
41 Even ordinary experiences in my life are full of risk. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
42 Having a bad thought is morally no different than doing a bad 
deed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
43 No matter what I do, it won’t be good enough. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
44 If I don’t control my thoughts, I’ll be punished. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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3. Heartland Forgiveness Scale (self-forgiveness subscale) 
 
Directions:  
 
In the course of our lives negative things may occur because of our own actions. For 
some time after these events, we may have certain thoughts or feelings about 
ourselves.  
 
Think about how you typically respond to such negative events. Next to each of the 
following items circle the number (from the 7-point scale below) that best describes 
how you typically respond to these types of negative situations. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers. Please be as open as possible in 
your answers. 
 
 
How do you think when a bad situation occurs 
because of your own actions? 
Nearly                                                   Hardly 
always                                                   ever 
true                                                       true 
of me                                                    of me                                                                                       
1. Although I feel bad at first when I mess up, 
over time I can give myself some slack. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I hold grudges against myself for negative 
things I’ve done. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Learning from bad things that I’ve done 
helps me get over them. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. It is really hard for me to accept myself 
once I’ve messed up. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. With time I am understanding of myself for 
mistakes I’ve made. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I don’t stop criticizing myself for negative 
things I’ve felt, thought, said or done. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Scoring Instructions: 
To calculate the scores for the HFS total and its three subscales, first reverse score items 2, 4, 6,  
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4. Psychological Control Scales 
MY MOTHER AND ME 
Below you can find a number of statements about the relationship with your mother  when you were growing 
up.  
Please circle a number between 1 (totally disagree) and 5 (totally agree). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During my childhood my mother: Totally                                  Totally 
Disagree                                 Agree 
 
 
• was always trying to change how I feel or think about things      1          2        3        4         5 
• changed the subject whenever I had something to say      1          2        3        4         5 
• often interrupted me      1          2        3        4         5 
• blamed me for hers and/or other family members’ problems      1          2        3        4         5 
• brought up past mistakes when she criticized me      1          2        3        4         5 
• was less friendly with me if I did not see things her way      1          2        3        4         5 
• avoided looking at me when I disappointed her.      1          2        3        4         5 
• stopped talking to me until I pleased her again.      1          2        3         4         5 
MY FATHER AND ME 
Below you can find a number of statements about the relationship with your father when you were growing 
up.  
Please circle a number between 1 (totally disagree) and 5 (totally agree). 
 
 
 
During my childhood, my father: Totally                                   Totally 
Disagree                                Agree 
 • was always trying to change how I felt or thought about things.      1          2        3        4         5 
• changed the subject whenever I had something to say.      1          2        3        4         5 
• often interrupted me.      1          2        3        4         5 
• blamed me for  his and/or other family members’ problems.      1          2        3        4         5 
• brought up past mistakes when he criticized me.      1          2        3        4         5 
• was less friendly with me if I do not see things his way      1          2        3        4         5 
• avoided looking at me when I disappointed him      1          2        3        4         5 
• stopped talking to me until I pleased him again.      1          2        3         4         5 
PEOPLE IN MY PEER GROUP 
Below you can find a number of statements about the relationship with people in your peer group when you  
were growing up. Please circle a number between 1 (totally disagree) and 5 (totally agree). 
 
            
 
 
 
During my childhood, people in my peer group: Totally                                  Totally 
Disagree                                Agree 
 • were always trying to change how I felt or thought about things     1          2        3        4         5 
• changed the subject whenever I had something to say      1          2        3        4         5 
• often interrupted me      1          2        3        4         5 
• blamed me for their problems      1          2        3        4         5 
• criticized me by bringing up past mistakes      1          2        3        4         5 
• were less friendly with me if I did not see things their way.      1          2        3        4         5 
• avoided looking at me if I disappointed them      1          2        3        4         5 
• stopped talking to me until I pleased them again.      1          2        3         4         5 
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5. Social Situation Questionnaire 
Directions:  
• When we are around people, it is sometimes not fully clear what their intentions are.  At the 
moment this occurs, we may have one or more explanations for what happened.   
• You will be reading a few stories about situations in which the intentions of others may not be 
clear.  Try to imagine that the situation in each story is happening to you.  
• After each story is a short list of explanations for what happened.  For each explanation, 
please circle how likely it is that you would believe each one at the moment it occurred.   
• REMEMBER- imagine that you are the person in the story and focus on your immediate 
reaction.   Try to answer as honestly as you can.  
 
Imagine the situation 
below has just happened 
to you: 
 
How likely is it that you think: 
 
Very                    Very  
Likely           Unlikely             
1. Cinema Situation  
Imagine that you are at the 
local cinema.  You 
unexpectedly see an 
acquaintance searching for a 
seat.  As you look in your 
acquaintance’s direction, 
she/he sits next to someone 
else. 
 
A. Your acquaintance has arranged to meet 
someone else 
 
5     4 3 2 1 
B.  Your acquaintance thinks he/she is too good 
for you 
 
5     4 3 2 1 
C.  Something you have done has annoyed your 
acquaintance so he or she ignored you 5     4 3 2 1 
2.  Car Situation  
Imagine you see one of your 
neighbours back out of 
his/her driveway and into 
your car, which is parked on 
the side of the street.  Your 
neighbour does not stop to 
assess the damage but drives 
away.   
 
A. Your neighbour couldn’t care less if he/she 
hit your car 5     4 3 2 1 
B. Your neighbour hit your car by accident but 
was in a hurry and decided that he/she would tell 
you about the accident later 
5     4 3 2 1 
C. Your neighbour does not like you to keep 
your car on the street and he/she was showing 
his/her frustrations 
 
5     4 3 2 1 
3. Neighbour Situation 
Imagine that you are doing 
some jobs outside your house 
one morning.  Two of your 
neighbours walk by.  As they 
walk by you they say 
something to each other but 
don’t acknowledge you 
A.  Your neighbours were criticising you for 
something 5     4 3 2 1 
B.  Your neighbours were too absorbed in their 
conversation to notice you 5     4 3 2 1 
 
C.  Your neighbours didn’t bother with you 
because they look down on you 
 
5     4 3 2 1 
4. Party Situation Imagine 
that you are at a party.  You 
are standing with a group of 
people.  One person in this 
group is particularly outgoing 
and is leading the 
conversation.  You notice 
that this person does not look 
at you or respond when you 
say something. 
 
A.  The person is showing you that he/she is 
offended by what you said 5     4 3 2 1 
B.  The person considers that you are 
uninteresting 5     4 3 2 1 
C.  The person is a good talker but not a good 
listener 5     4 3 2 1 
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Imagine the situation 
below has just happened 
to you: 
 
How likely is it that: 
 
 
Very                    Very  
Likely            Unlikely              
5.  Traffic Situation 
Imagine that you are driving 
down the road in fairly heavy 
traffic.  You are in the fast 
lane and passing quite a few 
cars in other lanes. 
Unexpectedly, someone 
changes lanes right in front 
of you. You have to hit your 
brakes to keep from hitting 
him/her. 
A.  You assume you were in the driver’s blind 
spot, so he/she did not see you when changing 
lanes 
5     4 3 2 1 
B.  You assume the driver cut you off on 
purpose to see if he/she could slow you down 5     4 3 2 1 
C.  You assume the driver was tired and not 
paying attention to what he/she is doing 5     4 3 2 1 
6. Work Situation 
Imagine that your boss is 
choosing people to do a task 
with him or her.  Your boss 
chooses some of your 
colleagues for the task but 
not you and does not explain 
why. 
 
A.  Your  boss thinks you’ve enough to do 
already 5     4 3 2 1 
B.  Your boss  thinks you’ve made mistakes on 
previous tasks he/she has given you 5     4 3 2 1 
C.  Your boss has overlooked you 5     4 3 2 1 
7. Break Room Situation  
Imagine that you are walking 
toward the break room at 
work and you hear some of 
your colleagues. When you 
enter the room, they don’t 
look at you or speak to you 
but carry on talking to each 
other.   
 
A.  Your colleagues don’t think you are 
entertaining enough to include 5     4 3 2 1 
B.  Your colleagues are giving you the silent 
treatment 5     4 3 2 1 
C.  Your colleagues will speak to you when they 
notice you are there 5     4 3 2 1 
8.  DVD Player Situation  
Imagine that your neighbour 
calls to ask if he/she could 
borrow your new DVD 
player.  When your 
neighbour returns the DVD 
player the next week, it is 
broken 
 
A.  It was an accident 5     4 3 2 1 
B.  Your neighbour broke it to annoy you 5     4 3 2 1 
C.  Your neighbour was jealous of your 
possessions and was careless with the DVD 
player 
5     4 3 2 1 
9. Hospital situation 
You find out that a friend has 
been admitted to hospital and 
has asked another friend to 
visit but not you. 
 
A. Your sick friend is not pleased with you 5     4 3 2 1 
B. It never crossed your sick friend’s mind to 
ask you 5     4 3 2 1 
C. The sick friend chose someone who is not as 
busy as you 5     4 3 2 1 
10.  Lunch Situation     
Imagine that you have 
arranged to meet up with a 
new friend in a pub or coffee 
bar.  After 15 minutes, your 
friend still hasn’t shown up. 
 
A.  Your new friend has forgotten about you 5     4 3 2 1 
B.  Your new friend has got delayed 5     4 3 2 1 
C.  Your new friend is blaming you for 
something  5     4 3 2 1 
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Imagine the situation 
below has just happened 
to you: 
How likely is it that: Very                    Very  Likely            Unlikely             
11. Ticket Situation     
Imagine that you and a friend 
decide to attend a concert.  
You volunteer to pick up the 
tickets, which are very 
expensive.  Several weeks 
after the purchase, you realize 
that your friend has still not 
paid you for the tickets, and 
he/she hasn’t said anything 
since. 
A.  Your friend misunderstood and thought you 
were paying 5     4 3 2 1 
B. Your friend has forgotten he/she owes you and 
just needs a reminder 5     4 3 2 1 
C. Your friend was hoping that you have 
forgotten all about it 5     4 3 2 1 
12. Washroom 
situation. 
Imagine that you are in a 
cubicle of the washroom at 
work. You hear two of your 
colleagues talking about a 
group of colleagues going 
bowling together.  No-one 
has mentioned this to you   
 
A. Your colleagues are punishing you for 
something 5     4 3 2 1 
B. Your colleagues invited the people they 
thought were most fun 5     4 3 2 1 
C. Your colleagues/fellow students have not yet 
got round to mentioning the bowling to you 5     4 3 2 1 
13. Restaurant Situation 
Imagine that you are sitting in 
a restaurant.  The people next 
to you are laughing and 
talking.  One of them 
abruptly stands up and his/her 
chair knocks into yours.  You 
spill your drink as a result.  
You hear continued laughter 
from their table. 
A.  The person did it on purpose because he 
enjoys embarrassing people 5     4 3 2 1 
B.  There was not enough room between the 
tables and a bump was inevitable 5     4 3 2 1 
C.  The person was caught up in his conversation 
and forgot you were there 5     4 3 2 1 
14.  Telephone situation. 
You discover that two of your 
friends have been regularly 
speaking to each other on the 
phone but neither of them has 
rung you for a long time. 
 
A. Your friends have had something important to 
discuss with each other 5     4 3 2 1 
B. Your friends see you as unworthy of their time 
and attention 5     4 3 2 1 
C. Your friends have condemned you for 
something you have done 5     4 3 2 1 
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Scoring Instructions for the Social Situations Questionnaire (SSQ): 
The SSQ consists of 14 scenarios. Nine are ostracism related.  Five scenarios 
are filler vignettes that are not ostracism related.  They are included in order to 
reduce the instrument’s susceptibility to demand characteristic bias (participants 
form an interpretation of the instrument’s purpose and unconsciously change 
their behaviour accordingly). 
 
For the ostracism items, each intent attribution is designed to represent one of: 
 
Punitive ostracism (P) 
Oblivious ostracism (O) 
Not ostracism   (N) 
 
SCENARIO A B C 
1. Cinema Situation N O P 
2  Car     
3  Neighbour Situation P N O 
4  Family Party Situation P O N 
5  Traffic     
6  Work Situation N P O 
7  Break Room Situation O P N 
8  DVD Player     
9   Hospital Situation P O N 
10  Lunch Situation O N P 
11  Ticket     
12  Washroom Situation P O N 
13  Restaurant     
14  Telephone Situation N O P 
 
 
Items 2, 5, 8, 11 and 13 are filler vignettes items. 
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Appendix 2: Study Advertisement 
 
Research Volunteers  
Would you like to help to improve our 
understanding of mental health?   
Have you a few minutes to spare? 
 
An NHS mental health professional is 
seeking volunteers to complete some 
online questionnaires.  It doesn’t matter 
whether or not you have experienced 
problems with your mental health – 
everybody can make an important 
contribution and anyone aged 18 or over 
can take part. 
Payment is not offered but you will be 
entered into a free £250 prize draw. 
 
To request more information, please email  
volunteer4research@googlemail.com 
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 Appendix 3: Consent Form 
 
Link to study Consent Form: http://www.surveygizmo.com/s/258645/consent-form 
  
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 
 
 
Title of Project: "Attitudes, Beliefs, Social Experiences and 
Mental Health Project." 
 
 Please Initial Boxes 
 1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information 
sheet date Version 3 (12.3.10) for the above study.  I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had 
these answered satisfactorily. ________________ 
 2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I 
am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason. 
________________ 
 3. I understand that data collected up to the point of 
withdrawal will be used in the study. ________________ 
 4. I have read the prize draw terms and conditions and wish 
my name to be entered into the draw. ________________ 
 5. I understand that I will be sent reminders by email to 
complete the questionnaires. ________________ 
 6. I understand that once this Consent Form is submitted it 
can not be altered by the researcher.  ________________ 
 7. I agree to take part in the study ________________ 
 
Date 
 
 ____________________________________________ 
 
Full name of participant  
 ____________________________________________ 
 
Email Address 
 
      ____________________________________________ 
  
Name and signature of researcher 
=============================================  
 
 
Thank you for submitting the Consent Form.   
  
 
  
You will shortly be sent a copy of the Consent Form to keep and a 
link to the research questionnaires.   
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Appendix 4: Information Sheets 
 
 
Information Sheet (Time One) 
Attitudes, Beliefs, Social Experiences and Mental Health Project. 
 
 
I would like to invite you to participate in a research study.  Before you decide whether or 
not to take part, you need to understand why the research is being done and what it would 
involve for you.  Please take time to read the following information.  Please ask (contact 
details are given at the end of this Information Sheet) if there is anything that is not clear or 
if you would like more information.   
What is the research about? 
The aim of the research is to explore how attitudes, beliefs and experiences relate to 
certain aspects of mental health.  It is possible that this research may eventually contribute 
to the development of effective new psychological treatments for certain mental health 
conditions.  
Why have I been chosen? 
Members of the public aged 18 years and over in various different settings are being invited 
to take part.  It does not matter whether you feel you have or haven’t experienced any 
issues with your mental health.   
How should I decide whether or not to take part? 
If you feel you can spare a few minutes to help, you may wish to decide to take part.   
What will happen if I take part? 
If you decide to take part, you should click on the link to the Consent Form, complete and 
submit it.  You will then be sent a copy of the Consent Form.  You will also be sent an 
identity number and a link which will take you to the online research questionnaires. You 
will be asked to enter your identity number, email address and Personal Details and then to 
complete the study questionnaires (you may save them and return to them later if you 
wish). Once you have completed them, you should click on the submit button. Two weeks 
later you will be sent a link to the second set of questionnaires to complete and submit.  
That will complete your participation in the study and you will not be asked to do anything 
else.  The personal details you give will enable the researcher to a) link your Time One and 
Time Two responses, b) include certain details like age and gender into the analysis and c) 
contact you for no purposes other than those described in this Information Sheet. 
What are the benefits and disadvantages of taking part? 
Completing the questionnaires will take around half an hour of your time.  Your participation 
will help improve our understanding of certain mental health issues and may eventually 
contribute to the development of effective new treatments. You may find that some of the 
questions touch on issues that raise concerns for you regarding your mental health.  In this 
case, you may wish to speak to your G.P.  It is hoped that around 160 people will take part 
and everyone who completes and submits the questionnaires will be entered into a prize 
draw.  Those who submit both Time One and Time Two questionnaires will receive two 
entries into the draw.  One cash prize of £250 will be awarded. *See terms and conditions 
for prize draw below. 
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What if I have any questions or concerns about taking part in the study? 
If you have any questions or concerns before, during or after your participation in the study, 
please contact the researcher (contact details given below).   
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes. Ethical and legal practice will be followed and all information about you will be handled 
confidentially.  Your Personal Details will be kept on a secure password protected website 
and on an encrypted database which is password-protected so only the researcher will 
have access to them.  They will not be passed on to anyone else for any purpose.  
Research data (that is, your responses to the study questionnaires) will be kept separate 
from your Personal Details and coded so only the researcher will be able to link your 
responses to you.  Once the study is complete, all identifiable information and data will be 
destroyed. 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on? 
You can withdraw at any time by contacting the researcher and you will not be contacted 
again. However, data collected up to the point of your withdrawal will be used. 
What will happen to the results? 
The results of the study will be written into a thesis and opportunities to publish them in a 
scientific journal will be sought.  You will not be identified in any report/ publication.   
Who has reviewed this study? 
The University of Hull has approved the study as worthwhile and ethical. 
Who to contact for more information about the study or if you have concerns relating 
to your participation:  
Elaine Middleton, Chartered Clinical Psychologist: 
• telephone (01904) 725353  or  
• email  volunteer4research@googlemail.com  
If you wish to take part in the study, now click on the link to the Consent Form, complete it 
and submit it.  Once it has been submitted it can not be altered.  You will then be sent the 
link to the study questionnaires. 
Please keep this information sheet for the duration of the study. 
 
* PRIZE DRAW TERMS AND CONDITIONS: Only participants who have taken part in the study and submitted the 
questionnaires will be entered into the prize draw.  Those participants who submit only Time One questionnaires will 
have one entry into the draw. Those participants who submit both Time One and Time Two questionnaires will have two 
entries into the draw.  The closing date for entry is 31.1.11.  The draw will take place on 1.2.11 and will be witnessed.  
The first name to be drawn will be awarded a prize of £250 to be paid by cheque to the name provided on the Personal 
Details Form.  The winner will be notified by email and asked to confirm their current address.   The email address 
provided by the participant on the Personal Details Form will be used to contact the winner.  Failure to respond in any 
circumstances to the notification email within three weeks from the date of the notification will result in the prize being 
offered to the next name drawn. 
13.3.10 Version 3    
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Information Sheet (Time Two) 
Attitudes, Beliefs, Social Experiences and Mental Health Project. 
Thank you very much for completing and submitting the Time One 
questionnaires relating to the above study.   
Now, please click on the link below, enter your Identifier Number and complete 
and submit the Time Two questionnaires. 
 www.surveygizmo.com/s/232549/mental-health-survey-2 
 
    
You will be sent email reminders to submit the questionnaires.    Once you have 
completed and submitted the questionnaires, this completes your participation 
in the study and you will not be asked to do anything else. 
 
 
 
Many thanks for participating in this study.  Your help is very much 
appreciated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Version 3  23.1.10 
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Appendix 5: Inter-item correlation matrices for SSQ 
Table 10:  Inter-Item Correlation Matrix for Punitive Ostracism 
 
Cinema Neighbour Party Work 
Break-
room Hospital Lunch Washroom Telephone 
Cinema 1.000 .583 .415 .513 .537 .484 -.423 .496 .524 
Neighbour .583 1.000 .425 .535 .483 .505 -.344 .475 .519 
Party .415 .425 1.000 .455 .470 .476 -.293 .456 .502 
Work .513 .535 .455 1.000 .449 .564 -.353 .552 .558 
Breakroom .537 .483 .470 .449 1.000 .602 -.378 .635 .552 
Hospital .484 .505 .476 .564 .602 1.000 -.333 .605 .593 
Lunch -.423 -.344 -.293 -.353 -.378 -.333 1.000 -.487 -.523 
Washroom .496 .475 .456 .552 .635 .605 -.487 1.000 .735 
Telephone .524 .519 .502 .558 .552 .593 -.523 .735 1.000 
 
 
Table 11: Inter-Item Correlation Matrix for Oblivious Ostracism 
 Cinema Neighbour Party Work Breakroom Hospital Lunch Washroom Telephone 
Cinema 1.000 .567 .398 .310 .510 .029 -.213 .412 .424 
Neighbour .567 1.000 .476 .408 .497 .051 -.271 .462 .585 
Party .398 .476 1.000 .415 .547 .102 -.313 .579 .547 
Work .310 .408 .415 1.000 .435 .007 -.312 .368 .504 
Breakroom .510 .497 .547 .435 1.000 .014 -.352 .598 .553 
Hospital .029 .051 .102 .007 .014 1.000 .038 .114 -.025 
Lunch -.213 -.271 -.313 -.312 -.352 .038 1.000 -.374 -.459 
Washroom .412 .462 .579 .368 .598 .114 -.374 1.000 .551 
Telephone .424 .585 .547 .504 .553 -.025 -.459 .551 1.000 
 
Table 12. Inter-Item Correlation Matrix for Not Ostracism 
 Cinema Neighbour Party Work Breakroom Hospital Lunch Washroom Telephone 
Cinema 1.000 .218 .058 .036 .082 .027 -.048 .016 .019 
Neighbour .218 1.000 .335 .276 .216 .211 -.148 .221 .247 
Party .058 .335 1.000 .429 .235 .297 -.143 .358 .221 
Work .036 .276 .429 1.000 .207 .361 -.083 .399 .428 
Breakroom .082 .216 .235 .207 1.000 .174 -.176 .401 .238 
Hospital -.027 .211 .297 .361 .174 1.000 -.244 .314 .390 
Lunch .048 -.148 -.143 -.083 -.176 -.224 1.000 -.060 -.110 
Washroom .019 .299 .344 .339 .374 .284 -.120 1.000 .312 
Telephone .018 .247 .221 .428 .238 .390 -.110 .334 1.000 
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Appendix 6: Normality plots for SSQ 
1. Punitive Intent Attributions 
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2. Oblivious Intent Attributions 
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3.  Not ostracism Intent Attributions 
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Appendix 7:  Regression models of POE variables on Obsessive Beliefs factors: 
zero order, partial and part correlations 
Table 13: Responsibility/Threat Model 
   
Model 
Correlations 
Zero-order 
% 
contribution 
(from R2) Partial 
% 
contribution 
(from R2) 
1 (Constant)     
HFS .605 37% .401 16% 
PCSt .421 18% .145 2% 
SSQp .529 28% .286 8% 
Dependent Variable: R/T 
 
Table 14: Perfectionism/Certainty Model 
   
Model 
Correlations  
Zero-order 
% 
contribution 
(from R2)     Partial 
% 
contribution 
(from R2) 
1 (Constant)     
HFS .629 40% .467 16% 
PCSt .402 16% .123 1.5% 
SSQp .460 21% .173 3% 
 Dependent Variable: P/C 
 
Table 15: Importance/Control of Thoughts 
   
Model 
Correlations 
Zero-order 
% 
contribution 
(from R2) Partial 
% 
contribution 
(from R2) 
1 (Constant)     
HFS .619 38% .420 18% 
PCSt .416 17% .128 1.6% 
SSQp .541 29% .301 9% 
Dependent Variable: I/CT 
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Appendix 8:  Regressions of maternal, paternal and peer psychological control 
on independent and dependent variables 
Table 16: Psychological control scales regressed on OC symptoms 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .22 .47  .47 .64 
PCS mother .23 .09 .15 2.47 .01 
PCS father .13 .10 .08 1.34 .18 
PCS peers .51 .10 .29 5.32 .00 
Dependent Variable: OCI-R  R2 =.173 F(3,326)=22.69 
 
 
Table 16 Psychological control scales regressed on OBQ-44 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 6.65 .60  11.15 .00 
PCS mother .49 .12 .24 4.09 .00 
PCS father .09 .12 .04 .71 .48 
PCS peers .74 .12 .32 6.13 .00 
 Dependent Variable: OBQ-44 R2 = .235 F(2,326)=33.44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
